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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Combat search and rescue (CSAR) is a vital strategic military function in 
the U.S. armed forces that embodies the profound value our nation places on 
individual human lives while it attempts to deny our enemies the opportunity to 
exploit isolated personnel.  On 1 October 2003 control of all USAF CONUS-
based dedicated CSAR assets was transferred from Air Combat Command 
(ACC) to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).  Transfer to AFSOC 
was CSAR’s fourth major reorganization in twenty years and was the latest in a 
turbulent procession of attempts to improve the combat effectiveness of 
dedicated CSAR forces. 
A.  SCOPE 
This study evaluates the long-term prospects for improving the combat 
effectiveness of Air Force combat search and rescue units in light of their recent 
transfer from ACC to AFSOC.  In order to frame my analysis, it is necessary to 
first present the doctrinal concept of CSAR in the context of its contribution to 
overall U.S. Personnel Recovery efforts.  
Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2310.2 (2000) establishes U.S. 
policy for personnel recovery and states: 
Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DOD civilian 
and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, 
beleaguered, detained, captured, or having to evade while 
participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the 
highest priorities of the DOD.  The DOD has a moral obligation to 
protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by 
adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being 
used as leverage against the U.S. (p. 3) 
From this guidance, U.S. Joint Doctrine defines Personnel Recovery (PR) 
as “The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and 
reintegration of U.S. military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who 
are isolated or missing while participating in a U.S.-sponsored military activity or 
mission” (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2004, p. I-1).  The latest draft of Joint Pub 3-50, Joint 
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Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, further explains that with specific approval from 
the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. PR efforts can be extended to “other 
governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals” (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2004, 
p. I-1).   
Joint Doctrine further assigns specific CSAR roles to each of the services 
and USSOCOM under the broad umbrella of PR (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 1996, p. I-1).  
CSAR is the central military contribution to overall U.S. Personnel Recovery 
capacity.  Joint Pub 3-50 defines CSAR as, “A specific task performed by 
recovery forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during war or military 
operations other than war” (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2004, p. GL-9).  Credible CSAR 
capability enhances the effectiveness of other PR efforts, and the Air Force is the 
only service that fields specialized units completely dedicated to the CSAR 
mission.   
The bulk of this study focuses exclusively on the specific USAF dedicated 
CSAR units that were transferred to Air Force Special Operations Command on 1 
October 2003.  These units are delineated in Figure 1 below.  In Chapter II, I use 
the term “CSAR” in reference to the general capability that was needed in order 
to begin initial combat operations in Afghanistan.  In Chapter III, I use the term 
“CSAR” in a generic historical sense, referring to all units contained in the 
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) and its organizational 
successors.  Throughout the remainder of the study, I use the terms “CSAR”, 
“CSAR forces”, and “dedicated CSAR forces” in specific reference to the 
AFSOC-gained units affected by the 1 October 2003 transfer and/or the 
capability they provide within the context of the overall U.S. Personnel Recovery 
system.  Again, my ultimate goal is to evaluate the long-term prospects for 
improving the combat effectiveness (in terms of availability and capability) of 
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Figure 1.   CSAR Units Transferred to AFSOC on 1 October 2003 
 
B.  BACKGROUND / RELEVANCE 
Brigadier General Thomas Dubose, Commander of Air Rescue Service 
from 1952-1959, uttered a timeless phrase about the commitment of the U.S. 
military to recover its own who become stranded behind enemy lines: 
To me it has always been a source of wonder and pride that the 
most potent and destructive military force ever known should create 
a special service dedicated to saving a life.  Its concept is typically 
American – we hold human lives to be the most precious 
commodity on earth.  (Thompson, 2001, p. 41) 
As mentioned above, CSAR is at the doctrinal heart of overall U.S. 
Personnel Recovery policy.  CSAR is a vital strategic function for the practical, 
psychological, and moral reasons quoted in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6.1 
(2000): 
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Successful Air Force CSAR enhances combat capability in three 
ways.  [First], CSAR operations return key personnel to friendly 
control, allowing them to fight again.  [Second], CSAR operations 
often influence the course of national and international politics by 
denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit the intelligence and 
propaganda value of captured personnel.  [Third], the presence of a 
robust and viable CSAR force increases morale, with a resultant 
increase in operational performance. (p. 2) 
Systemic budgetary neglect throughout the services has resulted in a 
general level of U.S. CSAR capability that falls far short of the “robust and viable” 
threshold set forth in Air Force Doctrine, Joint Doctrine, and DOD directives.  The 
will of brave rescue personnel molded in the spirit of General Dubose’s remarks 
has never wavered over the years.  However, poor organizational design and a 
lack of up to date tools has prevented the emergence of a supremely effective 
CSAR capability worthy of our great nation. 
On the organizational front, control of USAF dedicated CSAR forces has 
been passed around like a “hot potato” since the end of the Vietnam War.  As a 
result, Air Force CSAR has not gained enough traction and high-level advocacy 
within its ever-changing parent organizations to leverage the resources 
necessary to be truly effective on the modern battlefield.  Despite possessing an 
abundance of extraordinarily brave, highly motivated, and extremely capable 
personnel eager to get the job done, dysfunctional organizational arrays and 
nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicated CSAR forces 
from “getting to the fight” for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation’s past 
four major armed conflicts (Thompson, 2001, p. 27, 39).  Consequently, special 
operations forces (SOF) forces have routinely been called in to shoulder the 
CSAR load.  
The fact that SOF forces have been successful in conducting rescues 
from within enemy territory has proven a mixed blessing.  Although producing 
significant short-term results, using SOF for CSAR missions devastates the 
morale of brave and willing aircrews in dedicated CSAR units, while invalidating 
the considerable (but incomplete) resources invested in their aircraft and training.  
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Furthermore, over-reliance on SOF for CSAR pulls their valuable assets away 
from other sensitive missions, decreasing the long-term readiness of SOF.  
Recently a key initiative was undertaken to address these systemic 
problems in CSAR readiness and capability.  In Air Force CSAR’s fourth major 
reorganization in twenty years, the USAF transferred control of all its CONUS-
based CSAR assets from Air Combat Command to Air Force Special Operations 
Command on 1 October 2003.  For the second time in a generation, Air Force 
SOF (AFSOF) and Air Force CSAR forces now are united under the same major 
command (MAJCOM).  As described in the next chapter, the previous marriage 
between AFSOF and CSAR was a rocky one that ended in an ugly divorce.   
In the wake of the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, an urgent buildup 
of SOF was accomplished at the direct expense of CSAR forces.  As a result of 
the infamous (from the CSAR perspective) “Forward Look” study, AFSOF was 
given all of the Air Force’s most capable HH-53s and active-duty HC-130s, 
effectively gutting CSAR’s real combat recovery capability (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 
22).  Adding insult to injury, all of these critical assets stayed with AFSOF when 
they were separated from CSAR and moved to the newly-formed AFSOC under 
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  CSAR forces that 
remained in the USAF’s Military Airlift Command (MAC) were literally devoid of 
effective combat recovery capability for nearly ten years until they finally won 
multiple budgetary battles to field the HH-60G helicopter.  
C.  PURPOSE 
Despite the troubles in AFSOF and CSAR’s shared past, our nation has 
now turned to AFSOC to shape an enduringly effective dedicated CSAR force.  
AFSOC ownership of CSAR brings the AFSOC Commander and his staff to the 
table as potentially powerful new CSAR advocates.  AFSOC’s challenge is to 
ensure this most recent reorganization of CSAR does not become just the latest 
in a long line of futile attempts at improving Air Force CSAR capability.  This 
analysis looks at CSAR’s specific position within AFSOC’s organizational array to 
determine if the recent organizational re-alignment is likely to result in durable 
improvements in CSAR combat effectiveness. 
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Three major findings align to support my conclusion that CASR forces are 
poised for long-term success in AFSOC.  First, a recent shift from a platform- 
based outlook to a more capabilities-based outlook within AFSOC Headquarters 
has greatly diminished a historically unhealthy level of platform-based 
parochialism, resulting in a “CSAR friendly” organizational culture.  Second, 
effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, especially those 
regarding resource allocation and higher headquarters (HHQ) advocacy, result in 
good role alignment between AFSOF and CSAR forces.  This mitigates and 
minimizes many of the textbook difficulties faced by large organizations 
undertaking great change.  Third, a survey I conducted of newly-integrated 
CSAR crewmembers reveals highly receptive attitudes towards re-alignment 
under AFSOC.  Most CSAR “crew dogs” think AFSOC is a better advocate for 
CSAR than ACC, and believe the transfer will eventually bring about increased 
combat effectiveness in their units.  In general, aircrews are happy with the 
transfer and really want it to work.  In total, these findings illuminate a historically 
unique mix of organizational relationships that allow for long-term improvements 
in the combat capability of CSAR forces in AFSOC without threatening or 
negatively affecting the combat readiness of AFSOF.  
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The research methods I employ include the use of primary and secondary 
literature, incorporation of participant observation and personal experience, 
interviews, survey research, and case study analysis where appropriate to 
address key issues. 
Chapter II presents a brief case study of the critical CSAR issues involved 
in enabling initial U.S. combat actions in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan.  The case study provides an anchor point for further discussion of 
general CSAR issues while also accomplishing two specific goals.  First, it 
demonstrates the key strategic role the availability of CSAR forces plays in 
overall U.S. policy deliberations over the use of force.  Second, it vividly  
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illustrates the organizational shortcomings of CSAR forces as they were 
constituted in Air Combat Command that initiated their eventual transfer to 
AFSOC. 
Chapter III depicts CSAR’s turbulent organizational history in two phases.  
In the first phase, I describe the organizational constraints that hindered CSAR’s 
role in our nation’s last four major conflicts: Desert Storm, Allied Force, OEF, and 
OIF.  In the second phase, I present a chronological record of CSAR’s formal 
organizational history since the end of the Vietnam War.  All of my data for this 
chapter was combed from pertinent primary and secondary written sources.  This 
historical perspective, which highlights three previous major reorganizations 
where CSAR forces were either shifted to a different MAJCOM or combined 
with/separated from AFSOF, provides a richly textured backdrop to my 
evaluation of the prospects for CSAR’s long-term success in its most recent 
reorganization under AFSOC. 
Chapter IV evaluates the current state of CSAR in AFSOC’s cultural array 
in order to help forecast the long-term prospects for improved CSAR combat 
effectiveness.  I apply tenets of organizational theory to historical data gained 
from participant observation/personal experience during my previous tour on the 
AFSOC staff, and to recent data gained from interviews of current AFSOC 
leaders and staff members.  In this chapter, I contend that changes in AFSOC’s 
task environment stemming from its role in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) 
have driven the command away from an insular platform-based culture and 
towards a more open-minded capabilities-based culture.  I use a case study 
about the final resolution of a ten-year bureaucratic battle between parochial 
interests in AFSOC over funding for terrain following radar on the MC-130P 
Combat Shadow as an illustration of this shift in organizational culture.  I 
conclude the general mitigation of traditional clannish parochialism in AFSOC 
Headquarters results in a “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture and work 
environment that favors CSAR’s long-term success in the command. 
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Chapter V evaluates the current state of CSAR in AFSOC’s structural 
array in order to help forecast the long-term prospects for improved CSAR 
combat effectiveness.  As in Chapter IV, I apply tenets of organizational theory to 
historical data gained from participant observation/personal experience during 
my previous tour on the AFSOC staff, and to recent data gained from interviews 
of current AFSOC leaders and staff members.  In this chapter I analyze the key 
structural elements of AFSOC Headquarters as they relate to the production and 
advocacy of CSAR forces.  I contend that effective organizational constructs 
within AFSOC Headquarters, especially those regarding resource allocation and 
higher headquarters (HHQ) advocacy, result in good role alignment between 
AFSOF and CSAR forces.  I conclude that this minimizes many of the textbook 
difficulties faced by large organizations undertaking great change, and therefore 
this also favors CSAR’s long-term success in AFSOC. 
Chapter VI employs survey research of current CSAR line aircrew 
members to validate my findings from Chapters IV and V.  I made the survey 
aircrew oriented not as a slight to the crucial pararescue community, but only as 
a method to “stay in my lane” with a narrow enough focus to keep the length of 
this project manageable.  I intended to sample the entire universe of line CSAR 
aircrews, but coordination delays with Reserve and Guard chains of command 
resulted in my receiving primarily an Active Duty perspective.  The survey 
captured a vast amount of information covering broad areas that ended up 
outside the scope of this study.  I ended up conducting extensive statistical 
analysis on responses to Section 3 of the survey, and further informing that 
analysis with selected general comments captured in Section 4 of the survey.  
The complete survey, and an explanation of the academic basis of its 
construction, is contained in Appendix A. 
Chapter VII contains my conclusions and recommendations.  Overall, 
AFSOC Headquarters contains a historically unique set of stable, durable 
organizational traits that favor the long-term improvement of CSAR forces’ 
combat effectiveness.  My analysis of the resource allocation structure in AFSOC 
identifies key avenues for CSAR advocacy that can be exploited by powerful new 
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stakeholders without detriment to AFSOF funding priorities.  My survey research 
reveals CSAR crews enthusiastically support the transfer and have taken a 
practical and patient “long view” towards AFSOC being able to correct CSAR’s 
most deeply rooted shortcomings.  Thus, I contend the organizational table is set 
for CSAR to be successful. 
The key variable in translating AFSOC’s favorable organizational posture 
into tangible improvements in CSAR combat capability is the level to which high 
ranking AFSOC leadership will be effective as enthusiastic CSAR advocates in 
winning resource battles within the USAF budget process.  In order to prove their 
bona fides as aggressive CSAR advocates, AFSOC’s current leadership should 
heed a call from the field to immediately bolster the CSAR positions on HHQ 
staffs.  This will correct huge cuts in HHQ manpower positions suffered by CSAR 
when they left ACC, and will set AFSOC Headquarters up for sustainable CSAR 
support.  AFSOC’s urgent best effort to improve CSAR effectiveness is essential 
in order to keep faith with our fellow warriors as they continue to go in harm’s 
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II.  OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM CSAR CASE STUDY 
A brief case study of CSAR issues from Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan provides a compelling anchor point for further discussion about 
CSAR issues in general.  This case study simultaneously accomplishes two 
goals.  First, it bolsters my contention that CSAR capability is a vital strategic 
national resource in its own right.  Second, it vividly illustrates the organizational 
shortcomings of dedicated CSAR forces as they were constituted in Air Combat 
Command.  A realization of these two points by senior Air Force leaders in the 
wake of the opening salvos of OEF in Afghanistan fueled their decision to 
transfer CSAR forces to AFSOC in 2003. 
A.  OEF ILLUSTRATES CSAR IS A STRATEGICALLY VITAL NATIONAL 
RESOURCE 
A look at the preparations for initial OEF combat action in Afghanistan 
dramatically illustrates that the availability of CSAR capability plays a profound 
role at the highest levels in our nation’s deliberations on the use of military force.  
For a brief, critical period from 11 September through 8 October 2001, CSAR 
was a central, defining pivot point for overall U.S. foreign policy.  Bob Woodward 
(2002) captures the issue as follows:    
The problem was that bin Laden and the network were virtually 
untouched in their sanctuary 15 days after the attacks.  For many 
days the war cabinet had been dancing around the basic question:  
How long could they wait after September 11 before the U.S. 
started going “kinetic,” as they often termed it, against al Qaeda in 
a visible way?  The public was patient, at least it seemed patient, 
but everyone wanted action.  A full military operation – air and 
boots [on the ground] – would be the essential demonstration of 
seriousness – to bin Laden, America, and the world.  The President 
took the floor… “Are we ready to begin next week?” President Bush 
pressed.  “The [regional] CINC will be ready by then,” [JCS 
Chairman] General Shelton said, “But the issue is CSAR”… CSAR 
was the lifeline for those who flew combat missions and there was 
a presumption that the military brass would go all out to ensure it 
was in place.  This was not only because of the lives of the pilots 
and crew.  Any downed airman behind enemy lines is a potential 
hostage.  Anyone who had lived through hostage crises, from the 
52 Americans held in Tehran during 1979-1980 to those held in 
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Lebanon in the mid-1980s, knew the potential impact of American 
hostages on [U.S.] foreign policy. (p. 150, 152) 
This point about the importance of CSAR resonated particularly well with 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.  She believed there were only a few 
ways to make a really big mistake in the opening phase of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, and “a captured pilot was one of them” (Woodward, 2002, p. 178).  It 
wasn’t just memories of Carter’s hostages in Iran or Reagan’s in Lebanon, it was 
that “bin Laden or al Qaeda with American hostages would change the terms of 
the debate and give them immense leverage” (Woodward, 2002, p. 178-179). 
Frantic diplomatic efforts were underway to secure CSAR basing rights in 
Uzbekistan.  At a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 28 September 
2001 President Bush asked, “If the Uzbeks say no, what’s the plan?” (Woodward, 
2002, p. 164).  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld replied, “If we have no CSAR in 
the north you can’t have air operations in the north, just in the south” (Woodward, 
2002, p. 164).  To CIA Director George Tenet, this limitation on airstrikes due to 
lack of CSAR put the entire campaign plan in jeopardy: 
Tenet’s main action [with SOF and paramilitary teams] was in the 
North.  He had little to none in the South.  Now it looked like the 
bombing was going to have the exact opposite emphasis – none in 
the north, only in the south.  It would be a total mismatch. 
(Woodward, 2002, p. 164) 
Thus, the initial military response to the 9/11 attacks, and therefore the 
beginning of the military phase of the larger GWOT, became wholly contingent 
upon getting adequate CSAR coverage for planned airstrikes in support of 
Special Forces and CIA paramilitary teams operating in northern Afghanistan.  
Knowing that further delays “were not going to be acceptable to the President”, 
Rice commented in a September 30th side meeting that the lack of CSAR 
coverage “may delay air operations up to 12 days if we can’t mitigate this in 
some sense,” (Woodward, 2002, p. 178-179).  In response to Rice’s (and the 
President’s) concerns, Woodward (2002) describes how Secretary Rumsfeld 
considered launching operations without CSAR coverage, but was unhappy with 
the targets:   
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For this value of targets”, Rumsfeld said, I wouldn’t go in without 
CSAR.”  To lose a pilot for these low-value fixed and mud-hut-type 
targets made no sense.  For a really high-value target, yes, he 
might consider the risk.  Not for these. (p. 179)  
Fortunately, Herculean diplomatic efforts with Uzbekistan began paying off 
within the next several days.  At the NSC meeting on Thursday, October 4th new 
JCS Chairman General Richard Meyers reported that site surveys and airfield 
analysis had progressed well in the wake of diplomatic breakthroughs, and said 
that, “CSAR in the north will be stood up by Monday in Uzbekistan” (Woodward, 
2002, p. 195).  With this final hurdle to the beginning of hostilities finally cleared, 
all that was left was final approval from the President.  In the Saturday, October 
6th NSC meeting SECDEF Rumsfeld told the President, “We need a ‘go’ for the 
operation,” because the B-2 stealth bombers that were conducting the initial 
strikes in Afghanistan were being employed directly from Whiteman Air Force 
Base in Missouri, and would need to leave 15 or more hours in advance 
(Woodward, 2002, p. 204).  President Bush said, “Go.  It’s well thought through.  
It’s the right thing to do” (Woodward, 2002, p. 204).   
Three and a half tense weeks after the 9/11 attacks, as U.S. CSAR 
capability raced into Uzbekistan from forward staging bases in Germany and 
Turkey, President Bush revealed the fruits of all the U.S. government’s frantic 
behind-the-scenes diplomatic and military efforts to the American people.  On 
Sunday, October 7th at 1 PM Eastern, the President made an address to the 
nation.  He said: 
On my orders the United States military has begun strikes against 
al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan…Our military action is designed to 
clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless 
operations to drive them [the terrorists] out and bring them to 
justice…[To the men and women of the military], your mission is 
defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just; you have my full 
confidence; and you have every tool you need to carry out your 




B.  SOF FILLS THE CSAR GAP 
The one key fact that Woodward does not capture in all of his descriptions 
of the intense efforts expended to get CSAR coverage of northern Afghanistan is 
that the actual combat forces that arrived in Uzbekistan to provide the capability 
were Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT)-apportioned Air Force 
and Army SOF assets, not Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF)-apportioned 
dedicated CSAR assets (Herbert, 2003, p. 3).  As detailed in the following 
chapter, various organizational constraints denied dedicated CSAR forces the 
ability to deploy and employ on the President’s compressed timeline.  This 
shortfall of CSAR duties to SOF continued a disturbing historical pattern of CSAR 
forces being unable to provide their vital services when it really mattered, where 
it really mattered.   
The trend of SOF having to fill CSAR requirements began in 1990 with 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm in Iraq and carried through 1999 in Operation 
Allied Force in Kosovo before its latest manifestation in 2001 during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  In addition to describing the organizational 
constraints on dedicated CSAR forces that have caused this trend, the following 
chapter will also detail how this particular failure in OEF proved to be the “tipping 
point” that precipitated the 1 October 2003 transfer of CSAR forces to AFSOC 
that is the primary focus of this study. 
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III.  HOT POTATO: CSAR’S TURBULENT ORGANIZATIONAL 
HISTORY 
In this chapter, my goal is to provide a textured historical backdrop that 
adds context to my follow-on analysis of CSAR’s recent organizational shift to 
AFSOC.  I accomplish this goal in two phases.  First, I present a discussion of 
the organizational constraints that prevented CSAR forces from effectively 
contributing timely capability in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force, 
and Operation Enduring Freedom.  This demonstrates the historical trend of SOF 
having to fill gaps in CSAR capability and provides an effective lead-in for 
discussing the circumstances surrounding each of CSAR’s four major 
reorganizations in the past 20 years.  Second, I present a chronological record of 
CSAR’s turbulent organizational history since the end of the Vietnam War.  This 
chronology highlights three previous major reorganizations where CSAR forces 
were shifted to a different MAJCOM or combined with/separated from AFSOF.  
The sum of these two phases provides an overall historical perspective that 
further informs my primary evaluation of the prospects for CSAR’s long-term 
success in its most recent reorganization under AFSOC. 
A.  ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS KEEP CSAR FROM THE FIGHT 
Despite possessing an abundance of extraordinarily brave, highly 
motivated, and extremely capable personnel eager to get their job done, 
dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have 
prevented USAF dedicated CSAR forces from “getting to the fight” for the onset 
of hostilities in three of this nation’s past four major armed conflicts.  Due to the 
various organizational constraints detailed below, CSAR forces were not utilized 
at all in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, or in the opening phases of 
Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom (Thompson, 2001, p. 27, 39).  
Only in Operation Iraqi Freedom were CSAR forces initially deployed as 
designed in a timely manner.  However, they soon found themselves  
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improvising around their centralized Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) 
organizational design in order to forward deploy in small detachments to airfields 
deep inside Iraq. 
1.  Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm 
Operation Desert Storm over Iraq in 1991 found CSAR forces caught in 
transition.  On the fixed-wing side, CSAR forces were still reeling from the drain 
of all of their active duty HC-130 aerial tankers to AFSOF in the newly formed Air 
Force Special Operations Command (Tyner, 1996, p. 28).  On the rotary-winged 
side, having finally won a 10-year battle to get new helicopters after losing their 
prized HH-53Hs to AFSOF in 1980, CSAR helicopter squadrons were beginning 
the transition from obsolete UH-1s and HH-3s to new HH-60s (Thompson, 2001, 
p. 27).  Thompson (2001) captures the extreme disparity that existed between 
CSAR and SOF rotary-winged capability at the onset of Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm in the following passage: 
In August 1990, [CSAR] was in no position to contribute to the war 
effort.  Only one [CSAR] squadron, the 38th Air Rescue Squadron at 
Osan AB, South Korea, had received HH-60Gs, and those four 
aircraft were committed to the Pacific theater.  On the contrary, 
AFSOC contributed eight MH-60Gs and thirteen MH-53Js to the 
desert operation…The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 
also sent MH-60L and MH-47 helicopters to Saudi Arabia, and 
these aircraft would provide secondary CSAR capability. (p. 27) 
The overall result of CSAR’s organizational pinch was that there simply 
were not any comprehensive dedicated CSAR force packages mission-ready and 
available for a combat deployment.  Therefore, in a painful blow to the ethos of 
dedicated CSAR forces, General Schwarzkopf formally tasked SOCCENT to 
provide CSAR coverage for the entire desert air campaign (Thompson, 2001, p. 
27). 
2.  Operation Allied Force 
Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999 found CSAR forces 
reconstituted with HH-60s and more active-duty HC-130s, yet they were still 
“initially unavailable for deployment to the fight” (Thompson, 2001, p. 38).  CSAR 
forces were spread thin covering CSAR requirements for northern and southern 
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no-fly zones in Iraq, to the point that they had already for years shortfallen 
ongoing CSAR coverage for no-fly zones over Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight) to 
AFSOF (Bissonnette, 2002, p. 11).  Therefore, “AFSOF was able to respond with 
an efficient CSAR force” from within its organic Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (JSOTF) concept when tasked to provide CSAR coverage for Operation 
Allied Force” (Bissonnette, 2002, p. 12).  During combat operations over Serbia 
and Kosovo two aircraft, an F-117 and an F-16CJ, were lost to enemy fire.  Both 
American pilots were successfully recovered from behind enemy lines by AFSOF 
(Bissonnette, 2002, p. 11).  As Thompson (2001) says: 
Operation Allied Force was yet another wake-up call for [dedicated] 
rescue assets.  For the third time in the 1990s, [dedicated] rescue 
assets were on the sidelines as AFSOC forces were required to 
perform CSAR missions during combat operations [Desert Storm, 
Deny Flight (Ebro 33), and Kosovo] (p. 39) 
3.  Operation Enduring Freedom 
Representing another problem rooted in organizational array, in Operation 
Enduring Freedom dedicated CSAR forces were tied to large Aerospace 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) packages for vital communications and logistical 
support.  This left available CSAR forces organizationally unable to self-deploy to 
Afghanistan and effectively employ on the accelerated timeline required by the 
President in response to the 9/11 attacks.  AEFs are specifically organized to 
deploy broad sets of offensive aerial capabilities in huge, interdependent 
packages.  This makes each individual piece (like CSAR) non-self sufficient by 
design.  OEF presented a type of urgent, singular CSAR requirement the “big 
blue” Air Force was simply not organized to handle.  So yet once again, SOF 
assets provided the critical initial CSAR capability that allowed combat operations 
to commence in Afghanistan in accordance with the President’s timeline 
(Herbert, 2003, p. 1). 
4.  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Demonstrating yet another organizational conundrum, in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) CSAR forces were initially able to deploy to the theater as 
designed with a large AEF package, but then they had to rapidly improvise 
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through forward deployments in small packages to forward operating locations 
(FOLs) inside Iraq.  Many respondents to my survey lamented the ad-hoc nature 
of the communications and logistical support that they were forced to cobble 
together in order to effect the tactically crucial forward deployments.  One survey 
respondent, an HH-60G helicopter pilot, captured this issue as follows: 
Under ACC, CSAR forces had no capability to operate 
autonomously from forward or austere locations.  Lack of 
communications and other organic capabilities caused severe 
problems at the outset of our operations in both OEF and OIF.  
Connectivity and having to rely on other forces for base operating 
support was a real thorn in the side for a while. 
Once again, the “big blue” Air Force had not organized its CSAR forces in 
such a way as to make them responsive to the needs of the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC).  In true “improvise, adapt, overcome” fashion, CSAR units 
persevered despite their organizational array, not because of it.  In doing so, they 
exemplified the essential reality of the following statement about organizational 
dynamics from Air Force doctrine:   
An optimum system is one where all of the parts work better 
because of the other parts.  In broken systems, parts get work done 
in spite of the other parts. (U.S. Air Force, 2000, p. VI-1) 
B.  CHRONOLOGY OF CSAR ORGANIZATIONAL TURBULENCE 
With these previous operational breakdowns in mind, let us turn to the 
formal organizational history of CSAR forces.  Figure 2 below graphically 
illustrates the turbulent organizational history CSAR forces over the last quarter 
century.  The graphic also incorporates CSAR’s historical formal relationships 
with AFSOF.  After first tracing the organizational relationships between AFSOF 
and CSAR forces through the Vietnam War and its aftermath, following 
paragraphs will expand on this graphic and provide details of the circumstances 
that drove each of the four major reorganizations CSAR has undergone in the 
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Figure 2.   Organizational History of AFSOF and CSAR Forces 
 
1.  CSAR and AFSOF in Vietnam 
Organizational friction is sometimes overcome by the sheer importance 
and urgency of the task at hand.  Throughout the Vietnam War, AFSOF and 
CSAR forces collaborated very effectively despite belonging to separate 
organizations.  AFSOF forces belonged to the Tactical Air Command’s (TAC) 1st 
Special Operations Wing and CSAR forces belonged to Military Airlift 
Command’s Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), yet each made 
grand contributions to the other’s primary missions in Vietnam.  AFSOF A-1E 
“Sandy” escort aircraft integrated seamlessly with CSAR HH-3s, HH-53s, and 
HC-130s into comprehensive rescue packages.  Their efforts resulted in the most 
dramatic and heroic combat rescue operations in history as they continuously 
took their slow, vulnerable aircraft into harm’s way to rescue American pilots shot 
down behind enemy lines (Tilford, 1992, p. 72).  CSAR units contributed “42 
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men, one HH-3, five HH-53s, and two HC-130s to assist SOF” in the daring Son 
Tay POW camp raid (Tyner, 1996, p. 22).  AFSOF AC-130 gunships evolved into 
a rescue role while aiding CSAR HH-53s in an enterprising night rescue of two 
survivors from an AC-130 shot down along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in December 
1972 (Tilford, 1992, p. 135-136). 
2.  CSAR and AFSOF Fight for Survival after Vietnam 
After the Vietnam War, the urgent combat necessity that had forced such 
effective CSAR and AFSOF collaboration evaporated.  This left each 
organization to fend for itself in the brutal resource climate of the massive post-
Vietnam military drawdown.  Though both organizations suffered, CSAR did 
better maintaining itself under MAC than AFSOF did under TAC.  In 1972 CSAR 
forces peaked at 5700 personnel and 355 aircraft.  By 1976 CSAR units 
contained 4000 personnel and 214 aircraft (Tyner, 1996, p. 6).  ARRS, whose 
units had made 2,780 combat saves, and whose 3rd Aerospace Rescue and 
Recovery (ARR) Group was one of the most decorated units in Southeast Asia, 
sought to maintain itself in the post-Vietnam drawdown by branching out into 
peacetime roles and missions.  Tyner (1996) explains: 
Rescue’s largest flying squadron, the 37th Aerospace Rescue and 
Recovery (ARR) Squadron at Warren AFB, with all of its 
detachments, assumed the missile site security and support 
mission.  The 71st ARR Squadron assumed the transportation and 
logistic support role for several remote sites in Alaska.  The ARRS 
redesignated the 41st AAR Wing as the 41st Rescue and Weather 
Reconnaissance Wing because of its added Air Weather Service 
function. (p. 6-7) 
AFSOF faired much worse in the post-Vietnam drawdown.  Whitcomb 
(2003) captures the precipitous decline of AFSOF after Vietnam in his passage: 
During the period of the Southeast Asia conflict, the Air Force 
special operations community had possessed 550 aircraft of all 
types and over 10,000 personnel.  By 1979, the community had 
shrunk to 3,000 personnel with 28 aircraft.  Most of these were 
assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, FL, or 
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units.  Smaller units were 
located in Okinawa, Japan and Europe.  Their fleet consisted of old 
CH-3, UH-1, MC-130 and AC-130 aircraft which, except for some of 
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the C-130 variants, were over 20 years old.  Within TAC, the 
special operations units were the lowest priority in funding. (p. 16) 
3.  AFSOF Shortfalls Force Merger with CSAR 
a.  Desert One Focuses Spotlight on AFSOF 
“On 24 April 1980, the pivotal event that would shape combat 
rescue in the Air Force over the remainder of the century took place: Operation 
Eagle Claw and the disaster at Desert One” (Thompson, 2001, p. 23).  It is hard 
to overemphasize the impact the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt had on 
the organizational development of AFSOF and CSAR forces.  The profound 
organizational effects of the disaster at the Desert One landing zone in the 
Iranian desert continue to ripple through AFSOF and CSAR force structure to this 
day. 
The hostage rescue mission was aborted when several of the 
recovery helicopters broke down at an interim refueling site.  Then a hovering 
RH-53 collided with an MC-130 aircraft as the helicopter tried to take off.  The 
resulting explosion and fire were a horrible debacle.  Eight U.S. servicemen were 
killed and the U.S. suffered a searing international foreign policy embarrassment 
the likes of which it had not experienced since the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of 
Cuba almost exactly 19 years earlier (Lenahan, 1998, p. 146-148). 
Having withered on the vine in TAC’s fighter jet-oriented 
organizational array, AFSOF “showed a shocking lack of capability” in the failure 
at Desert One (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 17).  Tyner (1996) captures the issue as 
follows: 
In 1979, active duty Air Force special operations consisted of one 
wing, the 1st SOW, at Hurlburt Field, Florida and small MC-130 
squadrons in Okinawa and Europe…The Air Force had no funding 
past 1990 for the proven [AC-130] gunship.  The MC-130s were 
also “on the margins” of the USAF future program.  AFSOF were on 
the verge of total collapse as their [post-Vietnam] downward trend 
continued. (p. 10) 
Furthermore, AFSOF had no long range helicopter capability.  Prior 
to the hostage rescue attempt, planners on the TAC staff had re-allocated all of 
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the 1st SOW’s CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters to a non-SOF associated tactical 
communications unit (Kyle, 1990, p. 23).  The hodge-podge combination of Navy 
aircraft with Marine pilots thrown together as a work around for Operation Eagle 
Claw had failed miserably.  As one of the commanders of the ill fated mission 
stated afterward, “You cannot take a few people from one unit, throw them in with 
some from another, give them someone else’s equipment and hope to come up 
with a top notch fighting outfit” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 17).   
In the wake of the Desert One tragedy, embarrassed Air Force 
leaders were desperate to find quick solutions to special operations equipment 
shortfalls.  It didn’t take long for them to zero in on the Aerospace Rescue and 
Recovery Service’s new most prized possession: the HH-53H Pave Low III 
helicopter. 
b.  CSAR Loses the Pave Low 
Having diversified its missions and removed much of its focus from 
CSAR, ARRS had one big initiative going for combat rescue in the mid-1970s: 
the night and adverse weather capable HH-53H Pave Low III helicopter 
(Whitcomb, 2003, p. 15). 
The Pave Low III was born from “Southwest Asia Operational 
Requirement 114, dated 3 April 1967, which stated the need for a 
combat recovery system for night and foul weather…The new 
helicopter was to be ARRS’s “pride and joy: the most sophisticated 
helicopter in the world conceived by ARRS specifically for combat 
rescue in any weather.  The aircraft included a stabilized Forward 
Looking Infrared (FLIR) system, new computerized Doppler 
navigation system, a projected map display, and a terrain following 
radar. (Tyner, 1996, p.15) 
The first Pave Low III passed its initial operational testing in August, 1976, and 
the Air Staff funded eight of the helicopters to be operational by 1980 (Tyner, 
1996, p. 15). 
Already stinging from not being chosen for the initial hostage 
rescue attempt, CSAR got yet another demoralizing shock when preparations for 
Operation Honey Badger, the follow-up rescue plan, stripped them of their HH-
53Hs almost literally overnight.  Operation Eagle Claw failed on 25 April 1980, 
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and less than three weeks later, on 14 May, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
ordered all HH-53Hs to be immediately transferred from MAC’s Aerospace 
Rescue and Recovery Service to TAC’s 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) 
(Tyner, 1996, p. 15).  The helicopters were to be “included as part of a vastly 
increased armada of Army helicopters and the entire 1st SOW” (Whitcomb, 2003, 
p. 18).  Rescue forces were excluded from the mission preparation in favor of a 
new Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) under the command of the 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 18). 
Operation Honey Badger was never executed.  After the failure of 
the first rescue attempt the Iranian government divided the American hostages 
into several small groups and moved them constantly.  Unsure of the hostage’s 
location, and facing unfavorable launch windows because of the short nights 
during summer months, U.S. leaders were not willing to launch the second 
attempt until the fall (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 18).  Eventually, diplomatic efforts led to 
the release of all the American hostages.  However, CSAR would never again 
see their HH-53Hs.  As Whitcomb (2003) tells it:   
The Pave Lows and crews stayed in the 20th Special Operations 
Squadron at Hurlburt. This abrupt series of moves stripped the 
ARRS of its best, most capable combat rescue asset. The ARRS 
still had a small fleet of HH-53s.  Some did have the old Limited 
Night Rescue System, but most were unmodified and shrinking in 
number. (p. 18) 
To put it mildly, “The transfer of the Pave Lows became a source of great 
frustration and bitterness for those in ARRS” (Tyner, 1996, p. 15).  It would take 
nearly ten solid years of intense bureaucratic infighting through the Air Force 
budget process before CSAR forces would field another combat-capable 
recovery platform in the HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter. 
c.  CSAR and AFSOF Combine under MAC’s 23rd Air Force 
Despite having quickly shifted ownership of ARRS’s HH-53H 
helicopters to the 1st SOW, Air Force leadership still faced continued pressure 
from the national command authorities to increase the capability of AFSOF 
nearly three years after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt.  “Several after 
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action reports from Operation Eagle Claw and internal Air Force inspections 
suggested that to increase emphasis on Air Force special operations forces, the 
Air Force should consolidate all of its helicopters under one organization” 
(Whitcomb, 2003, p.19).  The process that formally combined CSAR and AFSOF 
under the same organization proceeded as follows: 
A combined Air Staff team from the Inspector General’s office and 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for plans and operations office conducted 
a thorough inspection and review of the Air Force’s special 
operations capability.  Their report reconfirmed earlier findings and 
recommended that all special operations forces and rescue forces 
should be consolidated into a single unit, preferably a numbered Air 
Force.  After a full air staff review, the Chief of Staff concurred with 
the studies and ordered the consolidation of the ARRS and Air 
Force special operations under a newly activated numbered Air 
Force. After discussions between the commanders of TAC and 
MAC, the Chief of Staff directed that the new numbered Air Force 
would be assigned to MAC and would be the 23rd Air Force. For 
unity of command, this organization would absorb both the ARRS 
and all Air Force special operations forces. (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19) 
The commander of ARRS suggested that this new organizational 
array would allow the development of integrated force packages that could then 
be placed at various locations around the world and respond to both rescue and 
special operations taskings (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19).  However, the TAC 
Commander, General Wilbur Creech, made his support of the transfer conditional 
on a guarantee that AFSOF be allowed to maintain “its separate identity”.  The 
MAC staff agreed, seeing the “identity issue” as a minor concession compared to 
the fact that they had won the battle for special operations missions and 
resources (Tyner, 1996, p. 19). 
As it turned out, MAC’s 23rd Air Force would be composed of two 
separate organizational entities: the ARRS at Scott AFB, Illinois, which would still 
command all of the rescue forces, and a newly activated 2nd Air Division located 
at Hurlburt Field, Florida that would command all special operations forces units. 
Each entity would maintain its distinct identity in accordance with General 
Creech’s wishes (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19).  
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Even though they were to “maintain their distinct identity”, Air Force 
special operations forces were uncomfortable being moved from TAC to MAC 
due to perceived differences in organizational culture.  As Chinnery (1998) tells it: 
The news [of transfer from TAC to MAC] hit Hurlburt like a late 
summer hurricane, and the immediate response was largely 
negative.  SOF troops viewed TAC as a command of warriors, and 
the move to MAC was viewed by most of SOF as a definite step 
down and an indication that Air Force leadership considered them 
as “trash haulers” and combat supporters, not leading edge, point-
of-the-spear warriors. (p. 233) 
Regardless of the reservations in the AFSOF community, the 
transfer took place on 1 March 1983.  The transfer received a much warmer 
reception among personnel in MAC, mostly because of organizational 
imperatives.  Whitcomb (2003) describes the MAC leadership’s reaction to the 
transfer in his passage: 
MAC commanders were happy with the arrangement because it 
gave them a way to protect their weather reconnaissance forces 
and rescue units in a numbered Air Force equal in stature to its 21st 
and 22nd Air Forces that commanded the airlift units…The first 
commander of the 23rd Air Force, Major General William Mall, was 
also pleased with the arrangement.  Even though the two 
“communities” would maintain a separation, he felt that a synergy 
naturally existed between them.  This synergy had been exhibited 
many times, especially during combat operations in Southeast 
Asia…In an interview with MAC’s Airlifter Magazine, he stated: “We 
created 23rd Air Force primarily to enhance the SOF mission.  The 
move capitalized on the synergism that exists between the special 
operations forces and the combat rescue forces because their 
mission, training, and equipment is similar…Combat rescue has 
always augmented the special operations forces mission, but now 
we are training these forces in special operations tactics to a 
greater extent that ever before.  Additionally, some special 
operations forces equipment is compatible and can serve both 
roles. The special operations forces Pave Low helicopters, for 
instance,  have  the  capability  to  rescue  a downed pilot in combat  
and still perform a special operations function without extensive 
modification of equipment or crew changes”. (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 
19-20) 
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Overall, General Mall saw the benefits of consolidating training, 
tactics, maintenance, and supply from one headquarters as the key to providing 
the military “with the capability to move our forces from one mission area to 
another to best accomplish both [AFSOF and CSAR] tasks” (Tyner, 1996, p. 21). 
d.  “Forward Look” Further Decimates CSAR 
Due to events far beyond his control, “the new 23rd Air Force did not 
become the synergistic model expected by General Mall” (Tyner, 1996, p. 21).  
Operations in Grenada and Lebanon exposed recurring problems in the nation’s 
overall SOF capabilities that were supposed to have been addressed after the 
failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt.  Powerful members in Congress 
decided that the services might need to be fundamentally reorganized.  
Congressman Dan Daniel (D-VA), Chairman of the powerful House Armed 
Services Committee (HASC) proposed an idea to create a new special 
operations force or command as a new “sixth service” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 21).  
In an article he wrote in the August 1985 Armed Forces Journal, Congressman 
Daniel stated: 
For the last four years, the current administration has been 
pursuing the revitalization of our SOF capability.  The Secretary of 
Defense has assigned the highest priority to this effort. 
Congressional support has been strong (and is growing); media 
attention has been intense (and generally favorable); and the public 
interest is intensifying. (Tyner, 1996, p. 27-28)  
The new commander of the 23rd Air Force, Major General Robert 
Patterson, responded to the intense Congressional pressure to quickly improve 
SOF capability by directing his staff to do a study called “Forward Look” (Tyner, 
1996, p. 28).  The study recommended that Air Force special operations forces 
be rapidly expanded from one wing equivalent to three at the direct expense of 
CSAR forces (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 22).  The plan directed the transfer of all of 
ARRS’s HC-130 tankers and remaining HH-53s to the AF special operations 
forces for the creation of overseas wings (Tyner, 1996, p. 28).  The plan was 
approved by the new MAC commander, General Duane Cassidy, on 30 
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December 1985, and by the Air Force Council on 28 May 1986 (Whitcomb, 2003, 
p. 22). 
In the wake of “Forward Look” ARRS was left with literally no 
realistic combat rescue capability.  A classified study titled “23rd AF assessment 
of Air Force Combat Rescue Capability” described all the assets remaining in 
ARRS units as “non-combat capable” (Tyner, 1996, p. 28).  Devoid of assets 
capable of performing combat recovery, ARRS was reduced to a largely 
administrative agency engaged in peacetime support roles and missions. 
4.  Rise of SOCOM Forces CSAR/AFSOF Split 
Continued frustration at the military’s lack of action to improve the nation’s 
overall SOF capability drove Congress and President Reagan to take the matter 
into their own hands.  The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 1987 Defense 
Authorization Bill included language creating United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM, 2003, p. 9).  As a unified combatant command, SOCOM 
would have components from each of the services.  The USAF’s contribution was 
23rd Air Force.  After “Forward Look”, AFSOF in 23rd Air Force’s 2nd Air Division 
had three Special Operations Wings: the 1st at Hurlburt Field, Florida, the 39th in 
Europe, and the 353rd in the Pacific (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24).  “To align his 
command to the new reality, General Patterson moved 23rd Air Force 
Headquarters from Scott AFB, Illinois to Hurlburt Field, Florida and deactivated 
the 2nd Air Division” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24).  As its special operations units 
immediately began to work and train with the other elements of SOCOM, CSAR 
forces in 23rd Air Force’s ARRS became even more marginalized.  Whitcomb 
(2003) captures the deeply dejected sentiment among CSAR units in his 
passage: 
The effect of all of this on the rescue community was disheartening.  
Except for one unit in the Pacific, they had been stripped of their 
most capable combat rescue helicopters and tankers and had 
shrunk to one wing-equivalent in total force structure.  The assets 
taken away were being used to build up the three special 
operations wings.  What aircraft remained were considered non-
combat capable.  More importantly, their owning command had 
completely changed its character.  They were orphans in a 
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command with a much different focus.  And most importantly, their 
future as represented by the procurement program for new 
helicopters had been cancelled. (p. 24) 
a.  AFSOF Sent to Newly Formed AFSOC 
Even after the establishment of SOCOM, 23rd Air Force was still 
administratively part of MAC and still owned distinctly non-SOF elements.  These 
included weather reconnaissance and aeromedical airlift units in addition to the 
CSAR forces in ARRS.  General James Lindsey, the first commander of 
SOCOM, was unhappy with the arrangement.  “He wanted nothing to do with 
these units and asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch, to 
transfer them back to MAC and to re-designate the 23rd AF as a major command 
as it transferred over to SOCOM” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24).  General Welch 
agreed.  The non-SOF units were transferred back to MAC in 1989, and the 23rd 
Air Force became Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) in May of 
1990 (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24).  Major General Hugh Cox, an AFSOF MC-130 
pilot and the first director of operations for SOCOM, recalls the profound 
organizational turbulence of the era in his statement, “The 1980s were marked by 
controversy, inter-service and intra-Air Force rivalries, jealousies, and frequent 
disruptive reorganization before the emergence of AFSOC with its own major 
command status” (Chinnery, 1994, p. 233). 
 
b.  CSAR Retained and Reborn in MAC 
The creation of AFSOC, and the resultant transfer of control over 
nearly all the USAF’s CSAR-capable assets to SOCOM, “convinced Air Force 
leaders that they needed to revitalize the service’s combat recovery capability” 
(Whitcomb, 2003, p. 26).  The Air Staff published a two-year study, the Rescue 
Force Structure Plan, that laid out a comprehensive program to rebuild an Air 
Force combat rescue capability.  “Its stated goal was the recovery of 65 percent 
of all aircrews downed in combat” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 26). 
The MAC Commander, General Cassidy, took advantage of this 
study and made a bold effort to reclaim CSAR’s honored legacy within the Air 
Force which was earned in the crucible of Vietnam combat operations.  He 
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developed a two-pronged strategy for revitalizing Air Force CSAR aimed at 
reversing its post-Vietnam drift towards peacetime roles. 
The first prong was organizational.  General Cassidy convinced 
senior Air Force Leadership to “remove ARRS from the disbanding 23rd Air 
Force, rename it the Air Rescue Service (ARS), and relocate it to McClellan AFB, 
California” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 27).  Whitcomb (2003) describes the dramatic 
organizational transformation as follows: 
The ARS was activated at McClellan on August 8, 1989 and 
assigned directly to MAC.  With that activation, the rescue forces 
and special operations forces were separate.  Since the war in 
Southeast Asia, the rescue community had come full circle.  
Unfortunately, in making the journey, it had lost its best combat 
rescue aircraft.  It would take time to correct the shortfall…Upon 
activation, the ARS published its mission statement.  It stated: “Air 
Rescue Service (ARS) is the focal point for USAF rescue…The 
primary mission of ARS is combat rescue which traditionally 
involves the helicopter recovery of downed aircrew members from a 
hostile environment, usually supported by HC-130 tankers and 
dedicated fighter aircraft.” (p. 27) 
The second prong of General Cassidy’s CSAR revitalization 
strategy was acquisitional.  Since all of ARRS’s HH-53s had been transferred to 
AFSOF for Pave Low modification, the staple aircraft of ARS units was the old, 
obsolescent HH-3.  This motivated General Cassidy to revitalize old initiatives to 
procure new helicopters.  His efforts began to pay off when the Air Staff 
programmed money to buy 16 UH-60As, which were modified for rescue duty 
and fielded as much more technologically advanced HH-60Gs.  These aircraft 
were scheduled to be delivered by 1989 as the first part of a steady buy of 10 
aircraft a year for several years.  They would be used to equip active, Guard, and 
AF Reserve units.  In February 1990, ARS began to receive its first HH-60Gs.  
They were assigned to the units in Korea and the Air National Guard (Whitcomb, 
2003, p. 27).  Unfortunately, and as described previously, deliveries of new HH-




5.  McPeak’s Dream Sends CSAR from AMC to ACC 
In the early 1990s Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill “Tony” McPeak 
engineered immense organizational restructuring throughout the entire Air Force.  
MAC absorbed tanker assets from disbanded Cold War stalwart Strategic Air 
Command (SAC), and was renamed Air Mobility Command (AMC) on 1 June 
1992 (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 1).  This initial reorganization had little 
impact on the structure General Cassidy had put in place for ARS. 
However, under General McPeak’s “one base, one boss” objective wing 
concept, many units were shifted between MAJCOMS in order to place them 
under the control of the command that hosted them (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 
2001, p. 7).  This dynamic, combined with General McPeak’s other pet project, 
“Total Quality Management” (TQM), precipitated yet another major reorganization 
of CSAR.  In the TQM era of “focused customer service”, AMC undertook several 
actions “to remove functions that were peripheral to the strategic air mobility 
mission” (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7).  One of these actions was the 
divestiture of the newly revived Air Rescue Service. 
Air Combat Command, a new MAJCOM formed from a combination of 
TAC assets and bomber forces from defunct SAC, became the executive agent 
for air rescue on 1 July 1993 (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7).  ARS units 
were split between ACC, USAFE, and PACAF in order to better align with the 
Unified Command Plan that spawned from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act.  In TQM terms, the idea was to make CSAR forces more 
“customer oriented” by placing them “under the direct control of the command 
whose downed pilots were the primary beneficiaries of the rescue service” 
(Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7). 
6.  CSAR Shortfalls Force Merger with AFSOF 
ACC leadership never captured or sustained the momentum generated for 
CSAR by General Cassidy in MAC.  After 10 years in ACC, “CSAR remained an 
overstressed, over-tasked mission area that was never able to get to the top of 
ACC’s list of priorities” (Herbert, 2003, p. 5).  In 2003 the ACC commander, 
General Hal Hornburg, admitted his organization’s “less than adequate job” of 
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budgeting for CSAR, “even though ACC units are the most in need of rescue 
support” (Herbert, 2003, p. 5). 
In the wake of CSAR’s inability to provide timely support for the opening 
salvos of OEF, General John Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), was 
quick to order a review of the CSAR mission area.  In October 2001, while bombs 
were still falling in Afghanistan, he ordered a comprehensive study of alternatives 
that resulted in a number of proposals (AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 3).  One of these 
was to transfer CSAR units to AFSOC.  General Jumper was USAFE 
Commander during Allied Force in Kosovo, so he had already “acutely felt the 
lack of a permanent CSAR presence in Europe” and had witnessed the 
successful rescues of downed F-117 and F-16 pilots by AFSOC forces (Herbert, 
2003, p. 3).  On 21 February 2003, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the 
Air Force, General Jumper signed CSAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 02-09 
that formally directed the transfer of all CONUS-based CSAR assets from ACC to 
AFSOC (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 1).  The PAD set an implementation date of 
1 October 2003.  Due to legal issues in the Unified Command Plan and turf 
battles with Regional Combatant Commanders, CSAR units based overseas in 
EUCOM and PACOM remained under the control of their respective theater air 
component (see Figure 1) (AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 4). 
Overall, the transfer affected units containing nearly 9000 personnel and 
120 aircraft (AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 4).  In general, “Air Force Leaders believe 
the move will strengthen CSAR operations, make them more efficient, and raise 
their profile by putting them in a smaller organization” (Herbert, 2003, p.1).  The 
hope is that these benefits will materialize because “the rescue mission will not 
be an afterthought in AFSOC as it was in ACC” (Herbert, 2003, p. 3).  The 
remainder of my study is dedicated to evaluating the long-term prospects for 
these benefits to actually accrue. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter’s historical overview provides context to my follow-on, more 
detailed analysis of CSAR’s recent organizational transfer to AFSOC.  Three 
main points from this chapter bear remembering as you move through the rest of 
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my study.  First, CSAR capability is a vital strategic national resource in its own 
right.  Second, CSAR has never lacked exceptional people, but various 
organizational constraints have prevented dedicated CSAR forces from 
effectively contributing timely capability in three out of our nation’s last four major 
conflicts, leaving SOF to fill the gap.  Third, CSAR has had a turbulent 
organizational history punctuated by four major, disruptive reorganization 
schemes in the last twenty years that involved varying degrees of connection 
with AFSOF.  With these three points in mind, the rest of my study will show how 
AFSOC’s current organizational construct contains durable cultural and structural 
characteristics that are likely to result in historically more effective development 
and application of dedicated CSAR capability. 
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IV.  CULTURE SHOCK 
A.  OH WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES 
In April 2003, after two years as the Chief MC-130P Combat Shadow 
evaluator pilot for Air Force Special Operations Command Standardization and 
Evaluation (AFSOC/DOV), I departed headquarters for a master’s degree 
program at the Naval Postgraduate School.  The CSAR transfer was just heating 
up as an issue in DOV and elsewhere in headquarters.  Directorates were 
entering a four-month sprint to complete the administrative details necessary to 
meet the mandated CSAR consolidation date of 1 October 2003.  I returned to 
AFSOC Headquarters in July 2004 to do research for this project and was struck 
by a dramatic change in organizational culture.  It appeared to me that there had 
been a sea-change in traditional assumptions and attitudes regarding the roles 
and missions of the command’s airframes.  The clannishness and parochialism 
that I had seen heavily influence the decision-making structure during my tenure 
seemed to have greatly faded, leaving the command more focused on 
developing broad capabilities than on “gold-plating” individual platforms. 
I will illustrate and evaluate this change in organizational culture, as well 
as assess its potential effects on CSAR, in four steps.  First, I’ll define 
organizational culture and discuss how the concept applies to Air Force aviation 
culture in general and AFSOC’s aviation culture in particular.  Second, I’ll present 
anecdotes from personal experience in dealing with MC-130P issues at AFSOC 
Headquarters that help illustrate this profound shift in culture.  Third, I’ll 
hypothesize a possible explanation for AFSOC’s culture shift based on 
organizational theory.  Finally, I’ll relate the effects this culture shift is likely to 
have on CSAR in AFSOC.  Overall, in this chapter I hope to vividly illustrate what 
seems to be a major shift in organizational culture within AFSOC Headquarters, 
provide a plausible explanation for the shift based on organizational theory, and 




B.  ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
An organization’s “culture” is the “set of values, guiding beliefs, 
understandings, and ways of thinking that are shared by [existing] 
members…and taught to new members as correct.  It represents the unwritten, 
feeling part of the organization” (Daft, 2003, p. 112).  On the surface, 
organizational culture is evident in “the ways people dress and act, and the 
symbols, stories, and ceremonies that organization members share” (p. 112).  On 
a deeper level, culture is the “underlying values, assumptions, beliefs, and 
thought processes” common to members in the organization (p. 112).  At its 
inception on 22 May 1990, AFSOC inherited very special military flying units 
diversely rich in their own individual and distinctive “surface” cultures (AFSOC, 
2002, p. 1).  Air Force Air Commando units all had unique symbols, stories, and 
ceremonies that defined their “specialness” within their respective mission areas. 
These units conformed nicely to the USSOCOM adage that “no one joins SOF 
per se.  Instead they join a unit, unique in its history, culture, and contribution to 
the joint SOF team.  Our nation is better served as a result of this diversity” 
(USSOCOM, 2003, p. 12).  
1.  “Deep” Cultural Assumptions and Parochialism 
Within the diversity of “surface” cultures among AFSOC’s individual flying 
units runs a “deep” culture common to aircrews throughout all of Air Force 
aviation: fierce pride in one’s own weapon system and good-natured 
competitiveness with other units.  Carl Builder (1989) captures the essence of 
this special, aviation-inspired pride in his passage: 
Air Force [aircrews] often identify themselves with an airplane: ‘I’m 
a 141 driver.’  ‘I flew BUFFS.’  Sometimes this identification goes 
right down to a particular model of an airplane:  ‘I fly F-4Cs’.  The 
pride of association is with a machine, sometimes even before the 
institution…There has always been a healthy rivalry among 
[aircrews] of different types of aircraft, not only among categories of 
aircraft flown, but even down to models of the same category 
[sound familiar MC-130E/H/P crews?]…This affinity of [aircrew] for 
airplane has its parallel in history in the cavalry soldier and his 
horse.  The airman, like the cavalryman, was not known for his 
modesty, or his objectivity, when it came to the employment of his 
chosen steed. (p. 22-23, 26, 33)  
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Thus, it can be said that aircrews tend to form very parochial, “tribal” 
groups intensely loyal to their assigned airframes.  Webster defines parochialism 
as “a narrowness of opinions” (Bolander, 1992, p. 290).  A certain amount of 
“narrowness” in SOF/CSAR aviation at the proper level is quite healthy.  As 
mentioned above, fierce pride in your own weapon system and good-natured 
competition with other units is very common throughout the Air Force.  In my 
experience, this “narrowness” fosters esprit de corps and excellence within 
AFSOC flying units.  However, I also experienced how these “healthy” parochial 
attitudes become corrosive and harm overall combat capability when they leave 
the flightline and end up unduly influencing long-term budget and acquisition 
decisions at headquarters.  An issue from my personal experience helps 
demonstrate the culture shift within AFSOC Headquarters from an unhealthy 
level of parochialism to a broader capabilities approach.  The issue was the saga 
to get all-weather capability (specifically terrain-following (TF) radar) funded for 
the MC-130P. 
C.  UNHEALTHY PAROCHIALISM IN ACTION 
1.  MC-130P TF Case Study 
A brief background review of the overall TF issue will aid in making my 
point.  AFSOC’s family of three MC-130 variants specialize in covert aerial 
refueling of special operations helicopters and the clandestine insertion, 
extraction, and resupply of special forces troops by airdrop or landing on austere 
runways (USSOCOM, 2003, p. 74).   
MC-130s are slow and have no offensive armament; therefore flying low to 
the ground at night and remaining undetected by an enemy is critical to 
accomplishing these tasks.  Two of the MC-130 variants, the MC-130E Combat 
Talon 1 and MC-130H Combat Talon 2 (henceforth collectively referred to as 
“Talons”), have advanced terrain-following (TF) radars that allow them to fly 250 
feet above the ground at night regardless of lunar illumination or weather 
conditions.  The pilots have no need to look outside as they follow computer 
generated symbols on their displays.  The third variant, the MC-130P Combat 
Shadow (henceforth referred to as “Shadow”), has no TF system.  Its pilots rely 
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on visual pilotage through night vision goggles (NVGs) combined with verbal 
directions from two navigators to operate in the night low-level environment.  The 
Shadow is therefore not equipped to safely fly low in bad weather where the 
pilots’ visibility is restricted. 
This TF disparity between Talons and Shadows has persisted despite the 
Shadow’s long-standing, validated operational requirement for all-weather 
capability (USSOCOM, nd, p. 5).  Much as racing teams do not have 
requirements for a certain percentage of slow race cars, AFSOC has no official 
requirement for “fair-weather” MC-130s.  The fact that Shadows are currently not 
all-weather capable is simply a result of consistently deferred budget priority 
since the aircraft were first assigned to AFSOC in 1990.  The inability of 
Shadows to get funding priorities was at least partly due to traditional clannish 
parochialism, or “hyper-advocacy”, by Talon advocates in headquarters positions 
pushing decisions to keep TF capability unique to their own community.   
The Talon community’s general resistance to TF radar upgrade on the 
Shadow has deep historical roots.  All-weather low-level penetration of hostile 
airspace is the singularly unique capability of the Talon fleet that has defined its 
special niche in SOF fixed-wing aviation since the first TF radars were installed in 
the Talon 1 during the Vietnam War.  As I saw it, TF had been their signature 
capability for so long that an unhealthy “deep” cultural assumption had formed 
within the Talon community that TF was their exclusive domain.  The resistance I 
sensed in headquarters seemed to revolve around the idea that spreading TF 
capability to other fixed-wing airframes, regardless of validated requirements, 
threatened the Talons’ “specialness” and their position as the platforms of choice 
for high priority missions.   
The discussions I pressed on the TF issue rarely centered on rational 
cost-benefit analysis; rather the debate was always shaded by this Talon cultural 
issue.  In terms of organizational theory, ingrained “deep” cultural beliefs about 
the role of the Talon within AFSOC led Talon advocates at headquarters to erect 
“barriers to change”.  Of the five barriers to change defined by Daft (2003), “fear 
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of loss” of prestige and status was the most prolific barrier I personally 
experienced when dealing with Talon advocates about TF upgrade for the 
Shadow (p. 146).           
A particular instance from a summer 2002 staff meeting is very 
representative of the barriers to change and entrenched parochialism I 
consistently came up against on the TF issue throughout my two years at 
AFSOC Headquarters.  I had recently returned from a combat deployment in 
Afghanistan during which my crew and I had providentially survived a crash in an 
MC-130P that I felt any kind of automated TF cuing device probably would have 
prevented.  In the meeting, which was about the integration of the SOCOM-
funded Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program with the 
Air Force-funded Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), I pointed out the MC-
130P’s validated requirement for TF (a copy of USSOCOM Joint Operational 
Requirements Document 022-91-IC was on the table), and I related the 
sequence of events that led up to my crash into a mountain in the Hindu Kush 
range. 
At the conclusion of the meeting, and after vociferously pointing out 
numerous reasons why he thought SOCOM could probably never be convinced 
to fund CAAP/TF for the MC-130P, a full Colonel assigned to the AMP/CAAP 
Integration Team blurted out, “In theory I guess TF might be okay for the 
Shadow, as long as you’re not trying to be a Talon.”  I’m not sure what enraged 
me more: the absurdity of the statement itself, or the fact that neither I nor 
anybody else in the room was particularly surprised such a statement was made.  
After hearing in detail about how our plane crashed, how my seven crewmates 
and I were nearly killed, and how all of this could probably have been avoided by 
installation of the TF system, this relatively senior decision-maker in AFSOC’s 
fleet modernization plans “circled the wagons” for the Talon community.  The 
narrow, parochial focus displayed by this Colonel (a Talon 1 pilot by trade) to the 
utter exclusion of any “big picture” concern for the safety of AFSOC aircrew 
members was startling.  He made his lukewarm advocacy for installing TF on the 
Shadow contingent on somehow maintaining the Talon fleet’s special cultural 
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niche in SOF fixed-wing aviation.  Such is the power of “deep” cultural 
assumptions, and such was the type of parochialism that had entrenched itself in 
the decision-making structure of AFSOC.  I had experienced first-hand Daft’s 
(2003) contention that, “It is only when organizations try to implement new 
strategies or programs that go against basic culture norms and values that they 
come face-to-face with the power of culture” (p. 112). 
D.  CRACKS IN TRADITIONAL PAROCHIAL ARMOR 
When I returned to AFSOC Headquarters in July 2004 to conduct 
research for this project, I expected to encounter the same cultural “barriers to 
change” regarding CSAR integration that I had faced a year earlier in my battles 
over TF upgrade for the Shadow, only writ large.  In my mind, the scale of the 
uphill battles I faced at headquarters in helping get upgrades for MC-130Ps paled 
to the magnitude of the wholesale organizational change imposed by CSAR 
consolidation.  I expected to find that the entrenched, parochial “powers that be” 
within headquarters had moved swiftly to establish CSAR at the bottom of the 
cultural “pecking order”. 
After my first two days of research at headquarters, I was stunned by the 
relative absence of parochial attitudes in the very same offices I had butted 
heads with in the past.  A new “big picture” atmosphere seemed to displace the 
narrowly focused, platform-based dialogue that pervaded headquarters culture 
during my tenure.  Two concrete examples representing gaping cracks in 
traditional parochialist armor illustrate the extent of cultural change I experienced.  
First, funding for CAAP/TF on the Shadow, which was a non-starter when I 
departed headquarters, had recently been approved.  For me, this was like 
finding the Holy Grail.  A transformational improvement I had directly fought for 
throughout my two years at AFSOC Headquarters, and had been advocating 
since I began flying Shadows over 13 years ago, had suddenly come to fruition.  
Second, a broad coalition of Shadow and Talon crewmembers from the DO and 
XP directorates had been assigned to serve with new CSAR HC-130 
crewmembers (and dedicated CSAR contractors) on an internal HC-130 
Integrated Process Team (IPT).  It struck me as completely new and different 
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that other “tribes” would be so intimately involved in an IPT whose sole purpose 
is to forward recommendations for CSAR HC-130 improvements to an Air Force-
level IPT for Personnel Recovery. 
These specific examples fed a sense of general culture change I found so 
profound that it altered the direction of my research.  Seeking confirmation, I 
questioned Shadow and CSAR crewmembers on the AFSOC staff in the DO and 
XP directorates specifically about this change in headquarters ambience.  
Shadow colleagues uniformly agreed that a change in atmosphere had occurred.  
Long-standing MC-130P issues that had been routinely marginalized in the 
bureaucratic shuffle now at least reached the table for serious discussion and 
consideration.  CSAR crewmembers I talked to uniformly expressed that they felt 
welcomed into the headquarters organization, and they experienced no overt 
attempts to ensure that they were denigrated to the bottom of the cultural 
“pecking order”. 
So what was it that changed so drastically between April 2003 and July 
2004 that could have such a profound impact on the “deep” culture in AFSOC 
Headquarters?  What caused the “underlying values, assumptions, beliefs, and 
thought processes” within headquarters to shift away from clannish, tribal 
parochialism centered on individual platforms, and towards a broader, more 
healthy focus on capabilities (Daft, 1993, p. 112)?  Why had an issue that had 
been festering for well over a decade (TF on the Shadow) suddenly gained 
traction, broad advocacy, and funding?  How had a massive organizational 
realignment (CSAR integration) occurred with such little apparent parochial 
friction in a headquarters previously characterized by tribal, platform-based 
loyalty? 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL SHIFT LEADS TO CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
CULTURE 
The culture shift I perceived that suddenly had traditional parochialists 
advocating TF for the Shadow and had broken tribal lines to contribute to a 
CSAR-specific IPT can be best explained using organizational theory.  I 
hypothesize that AFSOC’s apparent shift in organizational culture has been in 
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response to a major shift in the command’s assumed operating environment, and 
that the culture shift has been further enabled by top-down leadership initiatives.  
A discussion of the academic concept of organizational environment and how it 
applies to AFSOC’s cultural shift will lead into a discussion of the effects 
leadership initiatives have had in engineering and sustaining organizational 
change. 
1.  Organizational Environment as a Concept 
An organization’s environment is defined as “all elements that exist 
outside the boundary of the organization that have the potential to affect all or 
part of the organization” (Daft, 2003, p. 50).  An organization’s “task environment” 
is a sub-unit of the overall general environment and “includes sectors that have a 
direct impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals” (p. 51).  Daft 
(2003) defines ten of these environmental “sectors” in which organizations stake 
out their “domain”.  Sectors are “subdivisions of the external environment that 
contain similar elements”, and domain is “the chosen environmental field of 
action” (p. 50).   
Daft’s ten sectors were derived for corporate organizations operating in 
commercial markets.  AFSOC is a military organization operating in a political 
“market”, so rather than applying Daft’s model in its entirety, I have “cherry 
picked” those sectors from Daft’s model that directly impact AFSOC’s ability to 
accomplish its mission.  AFSOC’s primary responsibilities and budgets are 
provided by higher level authorities in the United States Government and at 
USSOCOM, so I have combined Daft’s Government and Financial Resources 
sectors for the purpose of defining AFSOC’s domain.  The resulting key 
environmental sectors that comprise AFSOC’s domain within its task 
environment are the Government/Financial Resources sector, Technology 





































Source:  Adapted from Daft, 2003, p. 51, Exhibit 4.1,  An Organization’s Environment
 
Figure 3.   AFSOC Domain for Mission Accomplishment 
 
2.  Organizational Environment in Action 
In its most basic organizational sense, AFSOC takes financial resources 
and planning guidance from higher headquarters (HHQ), combines them with 
advanced equipment and human resources provided respectively by industry and 
the U.S. Air Force, and produces highly trained Air Commandos proficient in the 
use of their advanced equipment.  All of this is done in order to provide the 
United States military specialized warfighting capabilities to address a defined 
range of perceived external threats.  Changes in the assumed nature of the 
external threats in the international sector (highlighted in red in Figure 3) are the 
focal point for the change in organizational culture that I witnessed at AFSOC 
Headquarters. 
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Prior to the September 11th attacks, in response to standing concept plans 
(CONPLANS), AFSOC had shaped itself to support Desert One-type scenarios: 
deliberately planned, highly precise, short duration strikes against singular 
strategic targets.  In my 12 years of operational flying in AFSOC, every major 
joint exercise or HHQ inspection I participated in revolved around just such a 
“single hit” scenario.       
In this task environment, an “A” team / “B” team mentality (varsity versus 
junior varsity) was allowed to flourish.  The major organizational assumption 
about threats in the external environment was that any individual “big mission” 
could be accomplished with a small number of extremely capable assets drawn 
from the “A” team.  In a limited resource environment, much funding went to 
develop exceptionally advanced capabilities in the “A” team segment of the 
command’s airframes rather than developing baseline capabilities across the 
command’s entire fleet.  The “shiniest toys”, assumed to be at the vanguard of 
any particular strategic mission, seemed to always get the most attention for 
capabilities upgrade.   
During my tours in the 58th Special Operations Wing at Kirtland AFB and 
in AFSOC Headquarters at Hurlburt Field, I watched with envy as money seemed 
to fall out of the sky every time the Talon 2 had a minor issue.  Funding instantly 
materialized for quieter cargo fans, bigger air conditioners, advanced software 
upgrades, and even autonomous landing system flight test programs.  This “gold-
plating” of an already very capable platform went on as the much older Shadow 
languished without even a baseline all-weather capability. 
Since the September 11th attacks, combat operations around the world in 
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have turned previous assumptions about 
AFSOC’s task environment upside down.  Surgical employment on individual 
strategic targets has given way to constant, simultaneous, widespread 
deployment and employment across the globe in multiple theaters of operation.  
In this new task environment, baseline capabilities throughout AFSOC’s fleet 
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gain higher prominence as there are simply not enough of the gold-plated, shiny 
toys to cover all AFSOC’s worldwide commitments simultaneously. 
It was exactly this realization about the new nature of AFSOC’s task 
environment that led to $25 million in CAAP/TF funding for the MC-130P.  Joe 
Norris, a previous Talon 1 pilot and now a central figure in AFSOC’s AMP/CAAP 
development team as a contractor in the Avionics Modernization and Training 
Systems office in the XP directorate, shared the specific argument that his shop 
used to “sell” the idea of funding CAAP on the MC-130P to USSOCOM.  The 
following excerpts from the formal issue initiative briefing given at USSOCOM 
show the issue was couched in terms of matching the aircraft’s capabilities to its 
actual wartime operating environment and providing expanded baseline 
capability to support AFSOC’s ongoing operations in the GWOT.  In its “impact if 
not funded” section, the briefing states:     
Combat Shadows will continue high risk low level flight without a 
TF/TA system placing aircrews and mission accomplishment in 
jeopardy.  [This] directly impacts SOF’s ability to support future 
GWOT operations -- aircraft will not have required avionics to 
support Detection Avoidance Navigation Threat Avoidance 
Navigation (DANTAN) concept of operation… critical Mission Area 
Plan detection and penetration deficiencies [will persist] and [result 
in continued failure to] meet CAAP Joint Operational Requirements 
Document (JORD) requirements. 
Thus, in the MC-130P CAAP/TF example, a strong organizational desire 
to remain relevant in the GWOT trumped traditional parochial notions about the 
sanctity of TF to the Talon fleet.  In a more general sense, AFSOC was forced to 
challenge some of its “deep” cultural assumptions as the organization recognized 
drastic changes in its task environment fueled by the GWOT. 
F.  LEADERSHIP INITIATIVES HELP FIGHT PAROCHIALISM 
1.  Senior Leader Initiatives 
Superimposed on AFSOC’s internal recognition of its new task 
environment are top-down Air Force leadership initiatives to refocus the entire Air 
Force away from its tradition of developing individual gold-plated platforms to a 
new focus on developing and providing broad capabilities to the joint warfighting 
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team.  The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) recently acknowledged this Air 
Force-wide problem of platform-based parochialism when he wrote:  
We must continue to break down the functional stovepipes and 
tribal loyalties that stand in the way of translating our vision into 
decisive operational capability.  We must get out of the mode of 
thinking only in terms of platform rather than in terms of capabilities. 
(Jumper, 2003, p. 1) 
Lieutenant General Paul V. Hester brought a similar outlook to AFSOC 
when he assumed leadership of the command early in 2002.  An F-15 pilot with 
no dog in AFSOC’s traditional parochial fights, Lt. General Hester echoed the Air 
Force Chief of Staff’s sentiments about focusing on capabilities rather than 
platforms when he recently wrote, “To stay a step ahead in a changing world, 
AFSOC must prepare for an uncertain future by developing effects-based 
warfighting capabilities that provide flexibility to operate throughout the full range 
of military operations” (Hester, 2003, p. i).   
My discussions with other senior leaders at AFSOC Headquarters, in both 
operational and administrative capacities, mirrored just such a new emphasis on 
providing a consistent set of broad capabilities to Joint Force Commanders 
engaged in the GWOT (versus previous focus on traditional Desert One-type 
“single hit” scenarios).  In separate interviews on 27 July 2004, AFSOC’s Deputy 
Director for Operations (ADO) and its Deputy Director of Plans and Programs 
(AXP) both told me how they specifically guard against the type of debilitating 
parochialism they experienced while rising through the ranks in order to affect 
this new emphasis on general capabilities. 
2.  Operational Initiatives 
On the operational side, Colonel Tommy Hull, AFSOC/ADO (and an MH-
53 Pave Low pilot by trade), told me how careful he was while serving as the 
Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander in the Afghani campaign to 
objectively assign missions to the unit/airframe best suited to the mission rather 
than allowing the cultural “pecking order” to enter into the calculation.  In one  
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instance, I personally witnessed Colonel Hull’s dedication to this principle when 
he assigned Shadows to help conduct a traditional “bread and butter” Talon 
mission in Afghanistan.   
The particular tasking Colonel Hull received was to infiltrate a coalition 
SOF team with eight armored humvees into an airfield in a remote area of 
Afghanistan.  Much like TF, blacked-out airland infiltration is historically the 
cultural niche of the Talon community.  Objective calculations about which 
available airframes could most quickly and effectively get the required number of 
vehicles to the landing site led Colonel Hull to assign two Talon 2s and two 
Shadows to the mission, even though Talon 1s were also available.  This was 
because the Talon 1s could carry only one vehicle each due to their cargo 
compartment configuration, and the Talon 2s and Shadows could each carry two 
vehicles.   
On the surface, the decision to employ Shadows on this mission seems 
like a simple, non-controversial “no brainer”.  However, in the not too distant past 
(as in some airdrop taskings at the beginning of operations in Afghanistan), 
Shadows would not have even been considered for this type of mission.  Rather, 
a tactically messy and convoluted scheme of maneuver would have been 
concocted to ensure Talons would have exclusive right to the mission, regardless 
of the operational limitations imposed by the Talon 1’s restricted cargo 
compartment.  Therefore, this type of simple reliance on weighing objective 
operational capabilities against mission requirements, in as much as it goes 
against previous subjective “deep” cultural assumptions about traditional roles of 
Talons and Shadows, illustrates leadership’s commitment to discard the 
unhealthy parochial baggage AFSOC sometimes carried in employing its forces. 
3.  Administrative Initiatives 
On the administrative side, Colonel Leonard Smales, AFSOC/AXP (and a 
Shadow pilot by trade), told me he saw his job as getting the broadest, most 
balanced capability ‘bang’ for each ‘buck’ AFSOC spends, regardless of what 
platform the capability eventually resides in.  Contained in this view is an implicit 
recognition of the shift in AFSOC’s task environment that makes this focus on 
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providing broad, baseline capabilities necessary.  CAAP/TF funding for the 
Shadow was one of a list of specific examples Colonel Smales mentioned of the 
types of projects the XP directorate is searching for that leverage huge capability 
increases out of relatively little money ($1 million per aircraft to add 
transformational all-weather TF capability).  Other high-impact, low-cost projects 
Colonel Smales mentioned included a laundry list of basic night vision 
compatibility and capability enhancements for CSAR airframes.  
In reference to the traditional clannish parochialism he himself endured 
while rising through the ranks, Colonel Smales said, “There is no ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
anymore in this headquarters, there is only ‘us’”.  The prevailing calculus in the 
XP directorate that drives budget and acquisition decisions involves the same 
kind of objective capabilities assessment mentioned above in the operational 
section.  Colonel Smales said, “In an unlimited resource environment we would 
simply spend our way into equally advanced capabilities on all of our platforms”.  
However, resource limitations force the directorate to carefully match the most 
cost-effective capability to any given requirement.  The “old way” of parochial 
tribes campaigning in isolation for upgrades to their respective platforms is dead 
and gone.  The “gold plating” dynamic has given way to wider, deeper, more 
creative analysis of ends and means. 
G.  CONCLUSION AND IMPACT ON CSAR 
Given that AFSOC Headquarters is staffed largely with aircrew members 
from line flying units, and line flying units are natural breeding grounds for 
platform-based parochialism, it is completely natural for some parochialism to 
migrate into headquarters decision-making processes.  As I explained earlier, 
this type of parochialism on HHQ staffs is by no means unique to AFSOC.  
Simply being assigned to a headquarters staff position certainly does not 
automatically endow an individual with a wider headquarters perspective.  When 
parochial interests become the primary motivator behind long-term budget 
priorities and acquisition decisions, they become unhealthy and corrosive to the 
development of balanced, capabilities-based combat power.  I personally 
experienced this type of corrosive parochialism at work during my two-year 
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tenure at AFSOC Headquarters.  During a research visit to AFSOC Headquarters 
fifteen months after my departure from its staff, I saw that the organization had 
taken an abrupt turn away from this type of corrosive parochialism.  I contend 
that this change in organizational culture can be best explained in terms of basic 
organizational theory, and that the change itself bodes well for the long-term 
effectiveness of CSAR under AFSOC. 
In organizational theory, it is axiomatic that an organization’s structure and 
culture are profoundly affected by the nature of its environment.  In an academic 
sense, AFSOC’s task environment is defined by its interaction with five of the 10 
environmental sectors defined by Daft (Figure 3).  Furthermore, as Dr. Erik 
Jansen, an expert in the field of organizational theory, pointed out in an August 
2003 lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, “an organization’s effectiveness 
is sometimes largely determined by its leadership’s ability to obtain sufficiently 
accurate information from its environment to inform its major decisions”. 
From the environmental perspective, dramatic changes in AFSOC’s task 
environment since the September 11th attacks have led the organization to 
challenge its previous assumptions about the nature of the threats it needs to 
defeat.  This, in turn, has generated profound changes in AFSOC’s 
organizational culture as the organization reorients itself away from short 
duration, “single hit” scenarios and toward the expansive challenges inherent in 
the GWOT.  From an organizational leadership perspective, changes in HHQ 
leadership’s emphasis regarding parochialism further enable this shift to a 
capabilities-based approach.  The sum of these internal and leadership-driven 
changes results in a general organizational environment at AFSOC Headquarters 
that is highly conducive to the long-term success of CSAR for three main 
reasons.  
First, AFSOC’s new breed of leaders, having bought in to the capabilities-
based paradigm espoused by the CSAF, actively work to prevent traditional 
parochialism from wielding the undue influence on decisions that it had in the 
past.  The Air Force Chief of Staff, the AFSOC Commander, and at least some 
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senior decision-makers in operational and administrative capacities at AFSOC 
Headquarters have dedicated themselves to shifting away from platform-based 
parochialism.  This helps create an overall command climate favorable to the 
integration of the new ideas, issues, and capabilities CSAR brings to AFSOC. 
Second, the Shadow CAAP/TF example demonstrates that AFSOC 
Headquarters, despite being a large organization with deeply ingrained culture, is 
flexible enough to reorient itself in dramatic ways in response to changes in its 
task environment.  Because of the relative ease with which this general dynamic 
of adaptation to the demands of the GWOT was able to resolve one of the most 
long-standing and intractable issues I ever dealt with at AFSOC, I doubt it was an 
isolated incident.  Rather, its positive effects on overall decision-making can be 
extrapolated and carried forward into AFSOC’s handling of similarly long-
standing CSAR issues.  If true, this certainly bodes well for the long-term 
effectiveness of CSAR in AFSOC.  The Shadow CAAP/TF example proves 
AFSOC possesses the flexibility to effectively adapt itself to changes in its task 
environment, so it is not much of a stretch to expect similar flexibility and 
effectiveness in the organization’s larger incorporation of CSAR responsibilities.   
Third, the more capabilities-based culture at AFSOC Headquarters fosters 
an internal physical working environment very favorable to CSAR crewmembers’ 
productivity.  Having more or less shed its parochial straight jacket, AFSOC 
apparently integrated its new CSAR staff with little if any attempt to impose its 
traditional cultural “pecking order” mentality.  During my research visit, the whole 
place just had a different “feel” to it.  In contrast to the parochial “barriers to 
change” I faced during my tenure, this healthier work environment leads me to 
believe that AFSOC Headquarters is organizationally poised to energetically 
support its new CSAR staff by advocating CSAR issues at the highest level.  
Additional, more specific structural attributes I found in AFSOC Headquarters 
that favor CSAR’s long-term success are detailed in the next chapter. 
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V.  ORGANIZING FOR ADVOCACY 
A.  THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE WEIGHS IN ON CSAR 
On 10 March 2004 the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James Roche, 
visited the Naval Postgraduate School, and I took the opportunity to ask him 
directly what the primary high-level motivations were for transferring CSAR 
forces to AFSOC.  His immediate and unequivocal answer was that the transfer 
was intended to “increase the visibility and advocacy of CSAR issues within the 
Air Force”.  He went on to explain how, since neither he nor other top Air Force 
leaders could ever hope to “get into the weeds” and become total experts on all 
critical CSAR issues, he wanted to create an advocacy structure that would help 
fix immediate critical problems as well as leave CSAR positioned to “fend for 
itself” long-term in order to break its historical “boom-bust” cycle.  Since AFSOC 
already flew basically similar airframes in similar operational environments, 
Secretary Roche said it seemed like a natural fit to align CSAR forces under 
AFSOC.  In terms of specific advocacy, Secretary Roche said it was his intent to 
make AFSOC’s three-star commander into CSAR’s principle advocate within the 
Air Force. 
In the previous chapter, I described how a change in organizational culture 
within AFSOC Headquarters produced a general work environment that eased 
the organizational friction of CSAR integration and resulted in a general decision 
environment favorable to addressing CSAR issues.  In this chapter, I show how 
AFSOC’s current unique array of organizational structures and processes 
addresses Secretary Roche’s intent of increasing CSAR visibility and advocacy 
by avoiding the typical structural tensions and dilemmas inherent in large 
organizational change.  In general, I illustrate the enormous organizational 
benefits CSAR accrues from being integrated with SOF under AFSOC’s cultural 
umbrella, yet differentiated from SOF by structural imperatives.  Specifically, I 
explain how legally mandated separate core processes produce low  
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levels of departmental interdependence, and ultimately embody a system of role 
clarity between CSAR and SOF forces in AFSOC that favors CSAR’s long-term 
effectiveness. 
B.  EXAMINATION OF CORE PROCESSES IN AFSOC 
As put forth by Dornbusch and Scott (1975), “Structure has to be built 
around an organization’s core process for transforming raw materials into 
finished products” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 51).  From this simple fact, 
Dornbusch and Scott expand on the concept of “core process” as follows: 
Every organization has a central process, or core technology, with 
at least three elements: raw materials, activities that transform raw 
materials into desired ends, and underlying beliefs about the cause-
and-effect relations that link materials, activity, and outcome. 
(Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 51) 
The bottom line is that in order for an organization to be effective, its “core 
processes or technologies must align with structure” (Bolman & Deal, p. 49).  
This section will focus on the core processes and procedures AFSOC uses to 
transform its allotted resources (money from the federal budget and “raw” airmen 
recruits from the USAF) into combat-ready CSAR and special operations forces 
(SOF) trained to accomplish their particular core mission tasks in support of Joint 
Force Commanders. 
Much as organizations must first divide work into manageable pieces 
before reintegrating the pieces into a finished product, it is necessary to divide 
this discussion of AFSOC’s complex transformation processes into manageable 
pieces in order to illustrate my overall point.  First, I present AFSOC’s overall 
production process in terms of Daft’s “manufacturing” and “service” construct.  
Next, I describe the differentiated core processes through which AFSOC 
Headquarters assembles its CSAR and SOF “product lines”.  Then, I present a 
discussion of departmental interdependence in terms of Thompson’s model to 
show how the interrelationships between CSAR and SOF production affect 
prospects for the long-term stability of CSAR.  Finally, I reintegrate all of these 
ideas to show that a legally mandated overall structure of differentiated core 
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production processes produces near text-book role alignment that results in a 
good organizational “fit” for CSAR in AFSOC.  
1.  “Manufacturing” and “Service” Components of AFSOC 
Daft’s concepts of manufacturing and service technologies, much like his 
environmental sector model used in the previous chapter, are designed to 
evaluate corporate organizations in commercial markets.  Therefore, the 
concepts are not wholly applicable to a complex military organization like 
AFSOC, which operates in a political “market”.  However, employing Daft’s ideas 
to identify how AFSOC’s manufacturing-oriented departments relate to its 
service-oriented departments provides a very useful frame of reference for 
evaluating the follow-on issues of how differentiated core processes lead to 
limited departmental interdependence, and produce nearly pristine role alignment 
between AFSOC’s CSAR and SOF “product lines”. 
The key differentiation between manufacturing and service organizations 
is the nature of the products they produce.  In their purest sense, manufacturing 
organizations produce tangible products that can be inventoried and stored for 
later use.  Service organizations produce intangible products that cannot be 
stored or inventoried; their services don’t really exist until demanded by the 
customer (Daft, 2003, P. 79).  As Daft (2003) says, “It is difficult to find 
organizations that reflect 100 percent service or 100 percent manufacturing 
characteristics…The vast majority of organizations involve some combination of 
products and services” (p. 80).   
Applying Daft’s concepts of manufacturing and service functions to 
AFSOC reveals that in its most basic sense, AFSOC Headquarters takes three 
“product lines” manufactured by three specialized subunits and integrates them 
into two separate sets of services that support Joint Force Commanders.  
AFSOC’s affiliated training subunits take individual airmen from the USAF and 
use financial resources provided by Air Force Headquarters and SOCOM 
Headquarters to transform them into “small-batch” production runs of specially 
trained airmen proficient in operating specialized equipment and performing 
specialized CSAR and SOF tactics (Daft, 2003, p. 73).  AFSOC Headquarters 
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then integrates each of the three tangible “product lines” of specialized airmen 
through joint training, exercises, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 
development in order to provide Joint Force Commanders the “services” inherent 
CSAR and SOF core tasks (Figure 4).  The combat-ready forces are tangible 
products that AFSOC “inventories” for future use; hence they fit the 
manufacturing construct.  The forces are employed to provide a range of “on 
demand” services at the request of a customer, hence the application of the 
service construct.  Viewing AFSOC through this manufacturing and service 
construct simplifies the following discussion of its differentiated core processes, 




Capability Studies JFSOCC1. Infiltration / exfiltration / resupply
of SOF personnel and equipment in 
non-permissive environments. 
2. Application of tailored surgical or
area suppressive fires.
3. Train/advise/assist foreign air forces. 
4. Rapid, precise sensor fusion, 
enabling airpower to find, fix, track, 
target, engage, and assess targets.





AFSOC in Daft’s Production Construct
AETC – Air Education and Training Command
JFACC – Joint Force Air Component Commander






From USAF / AFSOC
Priorities / Guidance













From USAF / SOCOM
Priorities / Guidance






From AFSOC / SOCOM
Priorities / Guidance














1. Return isolated personnel 
and material to friendly control.
2. Preserve combat resources and 
deny the enemy an intelligence source.
3. Sustain the morale, cohesion, and
tactical performance of friendly forces.
4. Influence national and international 
policy by denying adversaries’ 
exploitation of isolated personnel, 
special material, or objects.
Source: Data collated from HQ AFSOC/ 
XPPX (2003), Mission Area Assessment 
Conference After Action Report
 







2.  AFSOC’s Differentiated Core Processes 
According to Snook (2000), “To deal with increasingly complex tasks, 
systems create specialized subunits.  Once these subunits are segmented or 
differentiated, the primary challenge becomes one of integration or coordination – 
putting them back together again” (p. 143).  This dynamic is further supported by 
Daft (2003), who defines “lack of coordination and cooperation” as one of five 
primary “barriers to change” faced by organizations undergoing realignment (p. 
145).  The overall concern for the organization is that “fragmentation and conflict 
often result from a lack of coordination for change implementation” and that “old 
and new systems must be compatible” (Daft, 2003, p. 145).   
Fortunately for CSAR, AFSOC appears to have been able to avoid many 
of the classic coordination and integration problems generated by large 
organizational change through a structurally unique, legally mandated division of 
labor.  This division of labor is manifested in the two completely separate core 
processes that handle CSAR and SOF “production”.  SOF production is in the 
domain of SOCOM’s Strategic Planning Process and CSAR production is in the 
domain of the Air Force’s Corporate Review Process.  In the following sections, 
brief descriptions of each core process will lead to a discussion of how this 
division of labor reduces the amount of departmental interdependence to a 
manageable level, and ultimately provides a level of role alignment highly 
conducive to CSAR’s long-term effectiveness in AFSOC. 
a.  The SOCOM “Strategic Planning Process” 
Sticking with the manufacturing and service construct, the SOF 
assets under AFSOC constitute one of three separate “product lines” funded by 
SOCOM: Air Force SOF, Army SOF, and Navy SOF.  Using the frame of 
reference of the federal government as SOCOM’s primary customer, one of 
SOCOM Headquarters’ most important responsibilities is to prioritize its allotted 
resources between its three product lines.  The “Strategic Planning Process” 
(SPP) is the tool SOCOM Headquarters employs to stay “plugged in” to the 
overall U.S. national security apparatus while “matching fiscal reality with the 
mission requirements of SOF” (USSOCOM, 1999, p. 36).  The SPP is a four 
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phase, strategy-to-task methodology “that provides an analytical basis for 
determining and prioritizing SOF capability needs and optimizing resources to 
meet those needs” (USSOCOM, 1999, p. 36).  The four sequential phases are 
“Guidance Development”, “Capability Assessment”, “Program Assessment”, and 
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Source:  Data collated from USSOCOM (1999), SORR Assessment Director Handbook (p. 36-99)
 
Figure 5.   SOCOM Strategic Planning Process 
As depicted in Figure 5, AFSOC has continuous input to the 
process throughout each of the four phases.  However, because of U.S. law 
regarding military funding (detailed later in this chapter), CSAR issues are 
completely excluded from consideration in this process.  Therefore, only 
AFSOC’s SOF-specific units and programs are served by SOCOM’s SPP.  In 
fact, AFSOC has developed its own internal version of the SPP “strategy-to-task” 
methodology to prioritize its own programs for submission to the SOCOM SPP 
(HQ AFSOC/XPPX, 2003, p. 5). 
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b.  The Air Force “Corporate Review Process” 
Similar to SOCOM, the Air Force resource allocation approach 
“allows for an open assessment procedure that keeps all participants involved 
throughout the process” (Fedyszyn et al, 2003, p. A-3-21).  With initial top-down 
guidance, the Air Force program is developed from the bottom, up through 
successive levels of the corporate structure.  Each level is “organized to 
maximize the effectiveness of cross-functional expertise” (Fedyszyn et al, 2003, 
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Figure 6.   Air Force Corporate Review Structure 
Figure 6 shows the bottom-up nature of the process.  MAJCOM 
inputs to specific mission area integrated process teams (IPTs) flow upward into 
the matrix organization of higher level decision makers.  This less formal matrix 
organization, the “Corporate Review Structure”, was formed as an overlay on the 
Air Force’s formal operating organization in recognition of the fact that “it is 
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sometimes impossible to obtain consensus through formalized, hierarchical 
channels on complicated or controversial subjects” (Cooke and Preston, 1975, p. 
1).  Therefore, the Air Force Corporate Review Structure is optimized to handle 
key prioritization issues and major funding decisions, such as procuring new 
weapons systems.  Ordinary, day to day operations and sustainment decisions 
are left to the Air Force’s formal operating organization.  
Here is how AFSOC works CSAR issues through the Air Force core 
process.  The inter-MAJCOM IPTs at the gateway to the Corporate Review 
Structure are organized around specific mission areas designated by Air Force 
senior leadership.  AFSOC Headquarters develops and maintains mission area 
plans (MAPs) aligned with the Air Force-designated mission areas.  One of these 
mission areas is “Personnel Recovery/Recovery Operations (PR/RO)” (HQ 
AFSOC/XPPX, 2003, p. 5).  The PR/RO mission area is CSAR’s designated 
entry point to the Air Force Corporate Review Structure.  CSAR issues and 
concerns are collated in AFSOC Headquarters through internal processes and 
structures like the HC-130 IPT and the Personnel Recovery Vehicle program 
team.  These issues are presented by AFSOC to the inter-MAJCOM IPT for the 
PR/RO mission area (as described in the previous chapter, Colonel Smales 
currently represents AFSOC on this IPT).  Inter-MAJCOM coordinated positions 
from the IPT are then forwarded upward into the Air Force Corporate Review 
matrix for ultimate approval by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 
C.  EXAMINATION OF DEPARTMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN AFSOC 
Earlier, I used Daft’s manufacturing and service construct to help describe 
how AFSOC’s differentiated core processes for SOF and CSAR “production” 
handle the axiomatic organizational imperative of “differentiation” (division of 
labor).  In this section, I use Thompson’s model of departmental interdependence 
to illustrate how AFSOC’s differentiated core processes simplify the other 
axiomatic organizational imperative of “integration”. 
Snook (2000) presents three increasing levels of departmental 
interdependence and their corresponding coordination mechanisms originally 
developed by James Thompson (p. 152-154).  “Pooled” is the lowest, most 
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simple form of interdependence, and is characterized by different departments 
rendering discrete contributions to the whole.  Departments with pooled 
interdependence have low requirements for interaction with each other, so 
coordination within the organization is normally accomplished by standardized 
rules and procedures (p. 153).  “Sequential” is a higher, more complex form of 
interdependence, and is characterized by tasks that are required to be 
accomplished in a certain order.  Departments with sequential interdependence 
have moderate requirements for interaction with each other, so coordination is 
normally accomplished through detailed plans and schedules (p. 153).  
“Reciprocal” is the highest, most complicated form of interdependence, and is 
characterized by tasks that relate to each other as both inputs and outputs.  
Departments with reciprocal interdependence have high requirements for 
interaction with one another, so coordination is normally accomplished through 
on-going, real-time mutual adjustment between departments (p. 153). 
Individual elements within AFSOC’s internal processes involve various 
degrees of sequential and reciprocal interdependence.  Modernization plans, 
particular upgrade proposals, and issues jointly affecting CSAR and SOF all have 
intricate coordinating processes and scheduled deadlines to meet.  However, 
Figure 7 on the following page (an expansion of Figure 4) graphically illustrates 
that on a macro scale production of AFSOC’s two key finished products, combat-
ready CSAR and SOF forces, involves mostly pooled interdependence.  Each of 
AFSOC’s product lines is produced according to standardized rules and 
procedures within its own core process, and each product line renders its 
services to a separate customer.  Yet both product lines benefit the overall 
organization.  “Each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is 
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Figure 7.   AFSOC Role Alignment and Integration of HHQ Core Processes 
 
This high level of pooled interdependence in AFSOC’s key outputs by 
definition drastically reduces the integrative challenges AFSOC would have faced 
if CSAR incorporation had occurred under a more sequential or reciprocal 
structural array.  The lower levels of coordination and cooperation required by the 
“pooled” nature of AFSOC’s differentiated core processes severely limits 
potential friction points and helps overcome the structural, procedural, and 
cultural “barriers to change” present in every major organizational realignment.   
D.  EXAMINATION OF CSAR AND SOF ROLE ALIGNMENT IN AFSOC 
Differentiated core processes and the resultant simplification of 
departmental interdependence between AFSOC’s CSAR and SOF product lines 
form the core of a decisive and defining structural attribute that favors long-term 
CSAR effectiveness under AFSOC: superb role alignment.  Excellent role 
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alignment between the CSAR and SOF branches of AFSOC allows integrated 
synergies in modernization plans, logistics, capabilities development, and TTPs 
while maintaining the significant organizational benefits inherent in the 
differentiation of core processes.  A closer look at the concept of role alignment 
and its embodiment in the current AFSOC structure further cements the idea that 
CSAR is organizationally poised for long-term effectiveness in AFSOC. 
1.  Role Alignment as a Concept 
Good role alignment helps overcome the two most basic structural 
tensions faced by organizations: division of labor and coordination/control.  
Division of labor proscribes who is to do what (differentiation).  Coordination and 
control measures proscribe how to keep different parts working towards common 
goals (integration).  Basic structural design must simultaneously answer the 
questions of how to allocate work and how to coordinate different roles and units 
once responsibilities have been parceled out (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 40).  For 
most organizations, “Finding a satisfactory arrangement of roles and 
relationships is an ongoing, universal struggle” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 60).  A 
conspicuous lack of such a “satisfactory arrangement of roles and relationships” 
has prevented CSAR from ever gaining broad traction, advocacy, and 
effectiveness within any of its previous parent organizations. 
Organizational role alignment requires three steps: role definition, 
interface, and boundaries.  Role definition involves “defining the expected 
outcome and responsibilities for each of the various organizational roles.  
“Interface” involves “agreeing on the mutual expectations each role has of the 
other when handing off work, receiving work, providing service, or collaborating”.  
“Boundaries” involves clarifying the boundaries between roles, particularly for 
decision-making and responsibility” (Galbraith, Downey, and Kates, 2002, p. 83).  
2.  Role Alignment in Action  
Based on the above three-step model of role alignment, AFSOC has 
pulled a “hat trick” in adjusting its organizational structure to assimilate CSAR.  In 
terms of role definition, the AFSOC command briefing on CSAR integration 
clearly defines separate responsibilities for CSAR and SOF forces.  These 
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responsibilities, pulled from the primary source documents approving and 
implementing the CSAR transfer, are divided along the lines of task organization 
and through “operationally and doctrinally distinct lines of command” (HQ 
AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 20).  As depicted in Figure 7, CSAR forces are task 
organized to support conventional air operations through OPCON to the JFACC, 
and SOF are task organized to support theater SOC initiatives through OPCON 
to the JFSOCC.  In the source document approving the CSAR transfer, CSAF 
Program Action Directive (PAD) 02-09, this clearly defined role relationship 
between CSAR and SOF in AFSOC is further described as follows: 
It is important to note that while ADCON of applicable CSAR forces 
will transfer to AFSOC, these assets will not belong to USSOCOM 
but will remain under the operational control of the U.S. Air Force. 
(HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. J-II-2) 
In terms of interface, AFSOC Headquarters has integrated 53 CSAR 
personnel into various critical functions on its staff (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 4).  
Throughout the XP and DO directorates, CSAR and SOF staff members 
collaborate on many common issues, such as modernization plans, logistics, 
capabilities development, and TTPs.  Program Action Directive 02-09, elaborates 
on the interface issue as follows: 
The key benefit to transferring administrative control of select 
CSAR forces is the synergy achieved by managing comparable 
forces and missions under one command.  This change seizes the 
opportunity to leverage advances in concepts of operation and 
emerging technologies by integrating like skills more effectively 
within the Air Force. (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. J-6)  
The cross-cultural HC-130 IPT described in the previous chapter is a 
prime example of AFSOC Headquarters harnessing its available unique 
expertise in a flexible way through the direct interface of CSAR and SOF 
personnel.  Because CSAR and SOF “have many core mission similarities with 
common capabilities and combined training opportunities”, it is precisely these 
types of direct interfaces through which Secretary Roche and the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force hoped to leverage additional advocacy and capability for CSAR 
forces (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 2).   
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In terms of boundaries, in perhaps the most strident example of boundary 
making possible, funds for CSAR and SOF forces within AFSOC are legally 
bound to remain “separate and distinct”.  In fact, this legal separation of funding 
is one of the foundational assumptions of the entire CSAR transfer (HQ 
USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 2).  PAD 02-09, and the document implementing the 
CSAR transfer, AFSOC Programming Plan 03-04, make repeated references to 
this mandatory separation of funding.  Specifically, PAD 02-09 states, “Funding 
for rescue assets will be separate and distinct from SOF-unique air assets in 
AFSOC.  MFP-11 and MFP-4 funds will not crosswalk” (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, 
p. 2, J-II-2).  P-Plan 03-04 elaborates, “There will not be a crosswalk of funds 
between MFP-11 (USSOCOM) and MFP-2/4/5 (USAF).  MFP-1 (USAF) DPEM 
funds designated for SOF aircraft and those designated for CSAR aircraft will not 
be merged” (HQ AFSOC/XPC, 2003, p. 13).  Therefore, “who pays the bills” 
forms a hard legal boundary and is what defines which one of the previously 
described core processes AFSOC must work through to deal with any particular 
issue. 
In general organizational terms, “A group’s role system is critical.  The 
right set of task roles helps get the work done and makes optimal use of [the 
organization’s] resources” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 153).  For AFSOC in 
particular, good role alignment, stemming from legally separated funding and 
differentiated core processes, allows its CSAR and SOF forces to avoid the usual 
organizational pitfall of internal competition for resources.  The type of lopsided 
development that led to organizational dysfunction and CSAR ineffectiveness in 
SOF and CSAR’s previous “marriage” in the 1980s (when SOF garnered the 
lion’s share of resources and equipment at CSAR’s direct expense) is simply not 
legally possible in AFSOC’s current organizational structure. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
During my look at the particular structural arrangements and formal 
processes AFSOC Headquarters employs to address Secretary Roche’s intent of 
increasing CSAR’s visibility and advocacy within the Air Force, pivotal 
organizational traits emerged that validate AFSOC’s current approach.  Overall, 
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AFSOC’s current structure takes advantage of differentiated core processes, 
manageable departmental interdependence, and good role alignment to bestow 
significant organizational benefits on CSAR that currently favor higher-level 
visibility and advocacy of CSAR issues than at any time since the end of the 
Vietnam War. 
The recent creation of the PR/RO mission area, and the CSAF’s 
subsequent admonition that “all CSAR programs will be vetted through the 
established AF Corporate Structure and will compete equally with other programs 
and mission areas”, demonstrates the high level of importance that the current 
Air Force senior leadership places on CSAR capabilities development (HQ 
USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. E-2). Furthermore, in addition to providing the vital 
designated entry point for CSAR issues into the process, the PR/RO mission 
area allows high-ranking CSAR advocates direct access to the cross-functional 
levels of the matrix in the Corporate Review Structure.  With the transfer to 
AFSOC, CSAR now has many more high ranking advocates than ever before, 
culminating in AFSOC’s three-star commander.   
This advocacy from AFSOC will likely remain durable because 
differentiated core processes prevent SOF parochialism from ever gaining a 
foothold and directly challenging CSAR programs for funding.  Because of 
AFSOC’s unique structural array and clear role alignment, advocacy between 
SOF and CSAR is not a zero-sum game; AFSOC’s leadership is free to become 
aggressive CSAR advocates while posing no monetary or organizational threats 
to SOF programs.   
Coupled with the “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture and decision 
environment described in the previous chapter, the structural benefits described 
in this chapter seem to indicate CSAR is poised for long-term, durable 
effectiveness in AFSOC.  The next chapter tests this hypothesis against opinions 
from current CSAR crewmembers in line flying units who were surveyed nearly 
one year after their transfer to AFSOC. 
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VI.  ORGANIZATIONAL SNAPSHOT: CSAR CREW ATTITUDES 
AFTER ONE YEAR IN AFSOC 
In this chapter I analyze data collected from a survey of line CSAR aircrew 
members to help validate the main points I made in Chapters IV and V.  I 
administered the survey one year after CSAR transferred to AFSOC.  The survey 
itself and an explanation of the basis of its construction are contained in 
Appendix A.  The statistical analysis presented in this chapter is derived from 
Section 3 of the survey.  My conclusions in this chapter are further informed by 
general comments provided by CSAR crewmembers in Section 4 of the survey. 
A.  SURVEY METHOD 
I collected the data used in this chapter over a six week period in August 
and September 2004 using the survey presented in Figures 8-10 in Appendix A.  
I made the survey aircrew oriented not as a slight to the pararescue community, 
but only as a method to “stay in my lane” with a narrow enough focus to keep the 
length of this project manageable.  I intended to sample the entire universe of 
line CSAR aircrews, but coordination delays with Reserve and Guard chains of 
command resulted in my receiving primarily an active duty perspective. 
Nonetheless, the data is sufficient to gain some valuable general insights into 
active duty CSAR crew attitudes regarding their transfer to AFSOC. 
I constructed the survey just prior to an actual research visit to AFSOC 
Headquarters in July 2004.  I shifted the direction of my research as a result of 
the visit, so the survey ended up capturing a vast amount of information covering 
broad areas that ended up outside the scope of this study.  In the end, I only did 
deep statistical analysis of data derived from Section 3, “Personal Impressions”.  
This data is pertinent to help validate the main organizational points I made in 
Chapters IV and V, and it provides an extremely valuable “reality check” on my 
overall conclusion that CSAR is poised for long-term effectiveness in AFSOC. 
B.  SURVEY RESULTS 
I received 58 responses to the survey from line CSAR aircrew members. 
The 43 responses I received from the HH-60 community were split between 33 
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pilots, 6 aerial gunners, and 4 flight engineers.  The 15 responses I received from 
the HC-130 community were split between 8 pilots, 3 navigators, 2 loadmasters, 
1 flight engineer, and 1 radio operator. 
The following seven tables summarize the combined responses of all 58 
CSAR crewmembers to the seven questions in the “Personal Impressions” 
section of my CSAR in AFSOC survey.  Appendices B and C contain the same 
analysis broken down by HH-60 and HC-130 crewmembers respectively.  The 
histogram plots the number of individual occurrences of each of the five response 
choices to the question.  Although I included an overlay of the normal distribution 
curve and a printout of the mean and standard deviation to provide more depth to 
the data for those who are more “statistically inclined”, I derive my primary 
analysis in this chapter from the raw data on the histogram.  The pie chart 
converts the raw histogram information into percentages, which allows for easier 
comparisons to data from other questions. 





































































"I am pleased CSAR was transferred to AFSOC"  
Histogram of Section 3, Question #1
 (All Respondents)



















































































"My prospects for promotion are better in AFSOC than they were in ACC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #2
  (All Respondents)
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"AFSOC is providing better advocacy for CSAR issues than ACC did"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #3
  (All Respondents)
















































































"AFSOC is more responsive to procurement needs of my MDS than ACC was"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #4
  (All Respondents)



















































































"I am more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC"    
Histogram of Section 3, Question #5
 (All Respondents)



















































































"My unit is more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #6
 (All Respondents)

















































































"Over the long term, my unit w ill be more combat effective because it is in AFSOC"    
Histogram of Section 3, Question #7
   (All Respondents)











Table 7.   Survey Section 3, Question #7 Analysis (All Respondents) 
68 
2.  Survey Responses Explored 
My analysis of the survey data identified two major interrelated trends.  
The first is that CSAR crews hold tremendously positive attitudes towards their 
transfer to AFSOC.  The second is that these positive attitudes are not driven by 
expectations of personal, individual benefit or by measures of current combat 
effectiveness; rather they are driven by expectations of the communal benefits to 
be conferred by better CSAR advocacy and by prospects of future improvements 
in combat effectiveness. 
In regards to CSAR crewmembers’ positive attitudes towards their transfer 
to AFSOC, responses to question 1 reveal broad and deep approval of the 
transfer.  Nearly 83% of respondents expressed affirmative attitudes towards the 
transfer, with nearly 64% expressing strong positive support.  Conversely, less 
than 9% of respondents expressed negative attitudes towards the transfer, with 
barely above 3% expressing strongly negative attitudes.  In raw numbers, 48 of 
58 respondents expressed a positive attitude towards the transfer, 5 were 
ambivalent, and 5 expressed negative attitudes. 
In regards to the motivations behind the predominantly positive attitudes 
towards the transfer, the results from questions 2 and 5 reveal respondents have 
taken a generally non-personal view towards the overall benefits of the transfer.  
Furthermore, the results from questions 3, 6, and 7 reveal respondents have 
taken a distinct forward-looking, communal orientation towards the benefits to be 
gained from the transfer. 
Despite the overwhelmingly positive general attitude towards the transfer 
revealed in question 1, responses to question 2 and question 5 both reveal large 
proportions of ambivalence and negativity.  In question 2, fully 62% of 
respondents thought their prospects for promotion in AFSOC were the same or 
worse than they were in ACC.  Only 21% were convinced their prospects for 
promotion were significantly better in AFSOC.  In question 5, nearly two thirds of 
respondents (65.5%) felt their personal combat effectiveness was the same or 
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worse since the transfer.  Only 10% thought they were significantly more combat 
effective since being transferred to AFSOC. 
Given the apparent lack of personally oriented enthusiasm for the transfer, 
we must look at questions 3, 6, and 7 to find the more communally oriented 
sources of the overwhelmingly positive attitudes expressed towards the transfer 
in question 1.  In question 3, just under 90% of respondents thought AFSOC was 
providing equal or better advocacy for CSAR issues than ACC did.  In fact, fully 
60% felt AFSOC’s advocacy was superior, with over one third of respondents 
(35%) feeling strongly so.  Only just over 10% felt AFSOC’s advocacy of CSAR 
issues was worse than ACC’s. 
In questions 6 and 7, respondents revealed that although their units were 
not currently more combat effective due to the transfer, they overwhelmingly 
expected their units to become more combat effective over the long term due to 
the transfer.  In question 6, regarding views of current combat effectiveness, 
nearly two thirds of respondents (65.5%) felt their unit was the same or worse off 
than it had been in ACC.  Less than one fifth (19%) felt their unit was significantly 
more combat effective since the transfer.  However, in question 7, a full 81% of 
the same respondents felt that “over the long term, my unit will be more combat 
effective because it was transferred to AFSOC”, with more than two out of five 
(41.4%) feeling strongly so.  Conversely, just over 5% thought their unit would be 
less combat effective over the long term because of the transfer. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
1.  CSAR Crews Have Taken a “Long View” 
Overall, based on the above statistics it appears most CSAR “crew dogs” 
feel AFSOC is a better advocate for CSAR and will eventually bring about 
increased combat effectiveness; they are happy with the transfer and really want 
it to work.  Their positive attitudes towards the transfer persist despite an 
apparent lack of immediate improvements in personal promotion prospects or 
personal and unit combat effectiveness.  It seems CSAR crews have taken a 
“long view” towards their prospects for success in AFSOC.  Reflecting a practical 
sense of reality, one respondent hinted at this “long view” when he wrote in 
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Section 4 of the survey that, “In only one year AFSOC hasn’t had the time to fully 
address the [deeply rooted] shortcomings of the Rescue community in the 
tectonically slow acquisitions process”.  Many other survey respondents also 
alluded to this “long view”.  The following is a compilation of representative 
quotes taken from Section 4 of my survey that reflect optimism for CSAR’s long-
term prospects in AFSOC: 
“I think the future is bright for CSAR and AFSOC.  As in any 
change, there are bumps in the road that have to be navigated and 
changes in culture/paradigms that take time to work out”…”I think in 
the long run that the transfer to AFSOC will be a good thing, once 
the AFSOC staff is educated on our capabilities and potential”…”I 
think in the long run the move to AFSOC will be beneficial for both 
the unit and the Air Force”…”I am a supporter of the move.  In the 
long run it will make AFSOC more viable and a better provider of 
special air warfare capability (including CSAR)”. 
2.  Survey Results Validate My Findings in Chapters IV and V 
The above findings from Sections 3 and 4 of my CSAR in AFSOC survey 
support and validate the conclusions I proffered in Chapters IV and V.  In 
Chapter IV, I described how a change in organizational culture within AFSOC 
Headquarters produced a general work environment that eased the 
organizational friction of CSAR integration and resulted in a general decision 
environment favorable to addressing CSAR issues.  I concluded a general 
mitigation of traditional clannish parochialism in AFSOC Headquarters produced 
a “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture and work environment that favors 
CSAR’s long-term success in the command.  The positive attitude among CSAR 
aircrews reflected throughout the survey results is an “existence proof” of the 
presence of a “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture in AFSOC. 
In Chapter V, I contended that effective organizational constructs within 
AFSOC Headquarters, especially those regarding resource allocation and higher 
headquarters (HHQ) advocacy, result in good role alignment between AFSOF 
and CSAR forces.  I concluded this minimizes many of the textbook difficulties 
faced by large organizations undertaking great change, and bestows significant 
organizational benefits on CSAR that currently favor higher-level visibility and 
71 
advocacy of CSAR issues than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War.  
Survey respondents’ general impressions that AFSOC is providing better 
advocacy for CSAR than ACC did, and that they expect AFSOC will deliver 
significant improvements in CSAR units’ combat effectiveness over the long 
term, form a considerable block of informed opinion that aligns nicely with my 
Chapter V conclusions. 
Taken together, the “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture and decision 
environment described in Chapter IV, the structural organizational benefits 
accruing to CSAR described in Chapter V, and the general levels of current 
satisfaction and long-term optimism among newly transferred CSAR crews 
revealed in this chapter all seem to indicate that CSAR is indeed poised for long-
term, durable effectiveness in AFSOC.  The next and final chapter will present a 
more detailed summary of my overall argument and will highlight a critical 
initiative I think is essential for AFSOC’s senior leadership to undertake in order 
to ensure the command’s favorable organizational posture is sustained and 
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VII.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A.  OEF AS CSAR’S “DESERT ONE”? 
Regardless of rough spots in AFSOF and CSAR’s shared organizational 
past, our nation has now turned to AFSOC to shape an enduringly effective 
dedicated CSAR force.  AFSOC ownership of CSAR brings the AFSOC 
Commander and his staff to the table as potentially powerful new CSAR 
advocates.  AFSOC’s challenge is to ensure that this most recent reorganization 
of CSAR does not become just the latest in the long historical line of futile 
attempts at improving Air Force CSAR capability.  Hopefully we will be able to 
look back in five or ten years and see that OEF turned out to be CSAR’s “Desert 
One”: a formative failure that eventually drove effective organizational 
restructuring and dramatic increases in combat capability. 
As this thesis is being completed, CSAR forces are forward deployed in 
Afghanistan and Iraq flying essential combat missions in support of CSAR, 
humanitarian support, and emergency aeromedical evacuation requirements.  
Brave crews fly these missions in some of the most challenging terrain and 
weather conditions ever faced by military aviators.  In three years of combat 
operations in the GWOT, these harsh conditions have taken their toll on men and 
machines.  As Tyner (1996) puts it, “The desire to push the limit is a typical 
characteristic of a rescuer” (p. 65).  In his 1967 book That Others May Live, L.B. 
Taylor describes rescue as “a basic instinct”.  He captures the intense, almost 
primal motivations that pervade rescue units and animate rescue personnel in 
the following passage: 
The history of rescue is as old as the brotherhood of man.  No 
matter what era, area, or circumstance is involved, rescue has 
always been one of the great human interest stories.  Be it a man 
trapped in a cave, a survivor drifting aimlessly on a raft in the 
ocean, or a lone pilot lost and injured in the enemy-thick jungles of 
Vietnam, there is no saga quite as inspiring, as exhilarating, or as 
dramatic as that of man risking serious injury or death itself to help 
his fellow man in trouble.  Rescue is a compelling, all-
encompassing human instinct.  In crises people pull together as 
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never before, often performing deeds far beyond their normal 
capacities when a life is in the balance.  So it has always been and 
will always be.  Such is the nature of man. (US Air Force, 2000, p. 
III-7) 
CSAR forces willingly risk their lives to provide a service that overtly 
embodies the profound value our nation places on individual human lives while 
simultaneously serving the practical purpose of preventing damage to U.S. 
foreign policy by denying enemies the opportunity to exploit isolated personnel.  
Given this fact, our higher level governmental and military agencies owe 
dedicated CSAR units the most effective organizational structures and advocacy 
systems possible.  This analysis was devoted to examining CSAR’s specific 
position within AFSOC’s organizational array to determine if the 1 October 2003 
organizational re-alignment is likely to result in durable improvements in CSAR 
combat effectiveness.  The following section summarizes my overall argument.  
The final section echoes an initiative from the field that will help ensure AFSOC’s 
favorable organizational posture is sustained and exploited to real effect in 
improving CSAR combat capability. 
B.  SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS 
For a brief, critical period from 11 September through 8 October 2001, the 
availability of CSAR capability was a central, defining pivot point for overall U.S. 
foreign policy.  The primacy CSAR issues gained in the opening phase of military 
action in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan proved that CSAR 
capability is a vital strategic national resource in its own right.  OEF also vividly 
illustrated the organizational shortcomings of dedicated CSAR forces as they 
were constituted in Air Combat Command.  A realization of these two points by 
senior Air Force leaders in the wake of the opening salvos of OEF fueled their 
decision to transfer CSAR forces to AFSOC in 2003. 
CSAR has never lacked exceptional people, but various organizational 
constraints have prevented dedicated CSAR forces from effectively contributing 
timely capability in three out of our nation’s last four major conflicts.  Dedicated 
CSAR forces were not utilized at all in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, nor 
in the opening phase of Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom 
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(Thompson, 2001, p. 27, 39).  In each of these cases, SOF was required to fill 
the gap in CSAR capability.  Only in Operation Iraqi Freedom were CSAR forces 
initially deployed as designed in a timely manner.  However, they soon found 
themselves improvising around their restrictive, centralized AEF organizational 
design in order to affect forward deployments in small detachments to airfields 
deep inside Iraq. 
CSAR has had a turbulent organizational history punctuated by four 
extensive and extremely disruptive reorganization schemes in the last twenty 
years.  In the wake of the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, an urgent 
buildup of SOF was accomplished at the direct expense of CSAR forces.  This 
trend continued with the rise of USSOCOM and the creation of AFSOC.  CSAR 
forces were literally devoid of effective combat recovery capability for nearly a 
whole decade from the early 1980s through the early 1990s until they finally won 
multiple budgetary battles to field the HH-60G helicopter.  In an effort to bolster 
CSAR’s combat capabilities and advocacy structure, control of all USAF 
CONUS-based dedicated CSAR assets was transferred from ACC to AFSOC on 
1 October 2003. 
Dramatic changes in AFSOC’s task environment in the wake of the 
September 11th attacks have led the organization to challenge its previous 
assumptions about the nature of the threats it needs to defeat.  This, in turn, has 
generated profound changes in AFSOC’s organizational culture as the institution 
reorients itself away from short duration, “single hit” scenarios and toward the 
expansive challenges inherent in the GWOT.  A specific lessening of traditional 
platform-based parochialism in favor of a more capabilities-based approach has 
resulted in a generally “CSAR-friendly” organizational environment at AFSOC 
Headquarters. 
The particular structural arrangements and formal processes AFSOC 
Headquarters employs to increase CSAR’s visibility and advocacy within the Air 
Force contain pivotal organizational traits that validate AFSOC’s current 
approach.  AFSOC’s current structure takes advantage of differentiated core 
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processes, manageable departmental interdependence, and good role alignment 
to bestow significant organizational benefits on CSAR that currently favor higher-
level visibility and advocacy of CSAR issues than at any time since the end of the 
Vietnam War.  The resource allocation structure in AFSOC includes key avenues 
for CSAR advocacy that can be exploited by powerful new stakeholders without 
detriment to AFSOF funding priorities. 
Newly-integrated CSAR crewmembers have highly receptive attitudes 
towards re-alignment under AFSOC.  Most CSAR “crew dogs” feel AFSOC is a 
better advocate for CSAR than ACC, and believe that the transfer will eventually 
produce increased combat effectiveness in their units.  It appears CSAR crews 
enthusiastically support the transfer for communal rather than personal reasons.  
They have also taken a practical, realistic, and patient “long view” towards 
AFSOC’s ability to correct CSAR’s most deeply rooted shortcomings. 
Overall, AFSOC’s current organizational array contains a historically 
unique mix of favorable elements that bode well for the long-term combat 
effectiveness of CSAR.  AFSOC’s “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture, its 
unique organizational configuration, and the high levels of long-term optimism 
expressed among its newly-transferred CSAR aircrews all point to the same 
conclusion:  AFSOC’s current organizational construct contains durable cultural, 
structural, and human resource characteristics that will improve effectiveness in 
the development and application of CSAR combat capability over the long-term. 
C.  KEY INITIATIVE FOR ENSURING LONG TERM SUCCESS 
Thus, the organizational table is set for CSAR to be successful in AFSOC.  
The key variable now is the level to which high ranking AFSOC leadership will be 
effective as enthusiastic CSAR advocates in winning resource battles within the 
USAF budget process.  AFSOC leadership is in a window of opportunity to prove 
their dedication to CSAR, but CSAR crews’ optimism and “long view” cannot be 
sustained indefinitely without tangible forward progress.  In order to better 
position the command for sustainable CSAR support, AFSOC’s senior leadership 
should heed a call from the field and immediately increase CSAR representation 
on the command staff. 
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Survey respondents consistently lamented the net loss of MAJCOM-level 
CSAR staff positions that occurred in the transfer from ACC.  They consistently 
rated “increases in HHQ staff representation” as “critical” for ensuring a 
sustainable level of advocacy for CSAR in AFSOC.  The initial drafts of the 
transfer proposal I saw in late 2002 and early 2003 while working at 
AFSOC/DOV showed ACC relinquishing between 78 and 93 headquarters 
manpower positions to AFSOC in conjunction with the CSAR transfer.  The final 
Program Action Directive signed out of the CSAF’s office stated, “Fifty-three 
headquarters manpower authorizations will transfer from ACC to AFSOC 
effective 1 October 2003” (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 4).  In addition to this 
drastic manpower cut at the MAJCOM level, CSAR suffered further cuts at higher 
levels on the Air Staff.  One particularly well informed survey respondent, a 
former rescue squadron commander who is now the Chief of CSAR/SOF 
Requirements at Air Force Headquarters in the Pentagon, provided some 
numbers: 
On the Air Staff, XOOP [a section dedicated to CSAR issues] was 
disbanded and its 13-person shop was pared down to 5 and put 
under XOOS, then only manned to 60%.  AF/XPPM had both a 
SOF and a CSAR programmer, but now they only have one 
programmer to do both jobs.  The workload is the same, and the 
one guy is deployed, so we now have a KC-135 guy programming 
for all CSAR/SOF. 
An able, forceful, and sufficient staff is where the “rubber meets the road” 
in terms of advocacy.  By swiftly working to correct the huge cuts in HHQ 
manpower positions suffered by CSAR when it left ACC, AFSOC’s current 
leaders can prove their bona fides as potent CSAR advocates and will posture 
AFSOC Headquarters for sustainable CSAR support.  This entire study has 
endeavored to prove that the appropriate organizational machinery is in place to 
support CSAR’s success in AFSOC.  However, that machinery needs to be 
animated with enough appropriate expertise in the right places in order to 
translate higher-level advocacy into improved combat capability on the ramp.  
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APPENDIX A 
A. CSAR IN AFSOC SURVEY 
I collected the data used in Chapter VI over a six week period in August 
and September 2004 using the survey presented in Figures 8-10 below.  I made 
the survey very aircrew oriented not as a slight to the crucial pararescue 
community, but only as a method to “stay in my lane” with a narrow enough focus 
to keep the length of this project manageable.  I intended to sample the entire 
universe of line CSAR aircrews, but coordination delays with Reserve and Guard 
chains of command resulted in my receiving primarily an active duty perspective. 
I received 58 responses to the survey from line CSAR aircrew members: 
43 from the HH-60 community and 15 from the HC-130 community.  This ratio 
may have been more balanced had I gotten more Guard and Reserve 
participation.  Nonetheless, the data was sufficient to gain some valuable general 
insights into active duty CSAR crew attitudes about their transfer to AFSOC. 
I constructed the survey just prior to an actual research visit to AFSOC 
Headquarters in July 2004.  I shifted the direction of my research as a result of 
the visit, so the survey ended up producing a vast amount of information covering 
broad areas that ended up outside the scope of this study.  In the end, I only did 
extensive analysis of data derived from Section 3, “Personal Impressions”.  This 
data was pertinent to help validate the main organizational points I made in 
Chapters IV and V, and it provided an extremely valuable “reality check” on my 
overall conclusion that CSAR is poised for long-term effectiveness in AFSOC. 
I designed the survey according to academic principles gleaned from a 
contemporary social science textbook by Earl Babbie, and from two historical 
books on consumer and opinion research by Albert Blankenship (Babbie, 1995, 
p. 131-185) (Blankenship, 1943, p. 43-97) (Blankenship, 1946, p. 222-231).  I 
ensured the survey’s academic viability through consultations with Dr. Erik 
Jansen, my thesis advisor and an expert on survey research.  I ensured the 
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viability of the survey’s content by “pre-testing” it with CSAR experts in 
AFSOC/DOV and AFSOC/DOXJ prior to its general distribution. 
 
 








Figure 10.   CSAR in AFSOC Survey Page 3 
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APPENDIX B 
A. SUMMARY OF HH-60 CREW ATTITUDES AFTER ONE YEAR IN 
AFSOC 
The following seven panels summarize the responses of 43 HH-60 
crewmembers to the seven questions in the “Personal Impressions” section of 
my CSAR in AFSOC survey.  By crew position, the 43 respondents consisted of 
33 pilots, 6 aerial gunners, and 4 flight engineers.  The histogram plots the 
number of individual occurrences of each of the five response choices to the 
question.  For more “statistically inclined” readers, I included an overlay of the 
normal distribution curve and a printout of the mean and standard deviation.  The 
pie chart converts the histogram information into percentages to allow for easier 
comparisons to data from other questions. 
The biggest surprise I found in the HH-60 data was an across-the-board 
lack of strong negative feelings about being transferred to AFSOC.  Conventional 





































































"I am pleased CSAR was transferred to AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #1
  (HH-60 Crewmembers)














































































"My prospects for promotion are better in AFSOC than in ACC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #2
 (HH-60 Crewmembers)








Strongly  Disagree (0%)
 









































































"AFSOC is providing better advocacy for CSAR issues than ACC did"    
Histogram of Section 3, Question #3
  (HH-60 Crewmembers)



















































































"AFSOC is more responsive to the procurement needs of my MDS than ACC"     
Histogram of Section 3, Question #4
  (HH-60 Crewmembers)

















































































"I am more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #5
  (HH-60 Crewmembers)















































































"My unit is more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC"    
Histogram of Section 3, Question #6
   (HH-60 Crewmembers)















































































"Over the long term, my unit w ill be more combat effective because in AFOSC"     
Histogram of Section 3, Question #7
  (HH-60 Crewmembers)







Disagree Strongly  Disagree
 
Table 14.   Survey Section 3, Question #7 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers) 
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APPENDIX C 
A. SUMMARY OF HC-130 CREW ATTITUDES AFTER ONE YEAR IN 
AFSOC 
The following seven panels summarize the responses of 15 HC-130 
crewmembers to the seven questions in the “Personal Impressions” section of 
my CSAR in AFSOC survey.  By crew position, the 15 respondents consisted of 
8 pilots, 3 navigators, 2 loadmasters, 1 flight engineer, and 1 radio operator.  The 
histogram plots the number of individual occurrences of each of the five response 
choices to the question.  For more “statistically inclined” readers, I included an 
overlay of the normal distribution curve and a printout of the mean and standard 
deviation.  The pie chart converts the histogram information into percentages to 
allow for easier comparisons to data from other questions. 
I did not find any surprises in the HC-130 data.  Conventional wisdom held 
that HC-130 crews would have strong positive feelings about being transferred to 



































































"I am pleased CSAR was transferred to AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #1
  (HC-130 Crewmembers)





Neutral (0%) Strongly  Disagree (0%)
Slightly  Disagree
 





































































"My prospects for promotion are better in AFSOC than they were in ACC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #2
  (HC-130 Crewmembers)







Disagree Strongly  Disagree (0%)
 

































































"AFSOC is providing better advocacy for CSAR issues than ACC did"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #3
 (HC-130 Crewmembers)






Slightly  Disagree (0%) Strongly  Disagree (0%)
 








































































"AFSOC is more responsive to the procurement needs of my MDS than ACC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #4
   (HC-130 Crewmembers)







Strongly  Disagree (0%)
 








































































"I am more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #5
  (HC-130 Crewmembers)
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"My unit is more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #6
   (HC-130 Crewmembers)








Strongly  Disagree (0%)
 




































































"Over the long term, my unit w ill be more combat effective because in AFSOC"   
Histogram of Section 3, Question #7
  (HC-130 Crewmembers)






Slightly  Disagree (0%) Strongly  Disagree (0%)
 
Table 21.   Survey Section 3, Question #7 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers) 
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